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Conflict and Cooperation in
Long-Term Contracts
Robert E. Scottt
This Article uses the techniques of modern decision analysis and game
theory to analyze the decisionmaking strategies of parties to long-term
commercial contracts. Most parties to long-term contracts initially allo-
cate the risks of future contingencies and agree-either explicitly or
implicitly-to adjust this initial risk-allocation scheme if unanticipated
events occur. Once contract risks are initially distributed, however, each
party's self-interest may compel them to evade their responsibility rather
than adjust cooperatively as originally agreed. Visualizing the interactions
between contracting parties as an iterated prisoner's dilemma, the Author
attempts to clarify the dynamics of this adjustment process. Professor Scott
employs a game theoretic model to demonstrate that two polar behavioral
patterns-either conflict or cooperation-would dominate if parties were
unable to bargain over adjustment. However, this choice may not occur, he
suggests, because even parties that are precluded from negotiating each
adjustment option, nevertheless can communicate their intentions to each
other. Under these conditions, a cooperative equilibrium will emerge so
long as one of the parties commits to a strategy of conditional cooperation
before the first adjustment is necessary. Professor Scott notes that in more
realistic contractual situations, some breakdowns in patterns of mutual
cooperation are inevitable. In actual contract settings, substantial
problems of information and enforcement may threaten the parties' efforts
to realize a cooperative equilibrium. Nevertheless, he concludes that parties
in continuing relationships can invoke various legal and extralegal mecha-
nisms to reduce these information and enforcement deficits and
strengthen the existing matrix of social and contractual norms.
t Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
I would like to thank Ken Abraham, Frank Buckley, Robert Clark, Clay Gillette, Victor
Goldberg, Tom Jackson, John Jeffries, Doug Leslie, Saul Levmore, Jon Macey, Alan Schwartz, Bill
Stuntz, and the participants in faculty workshops at the Harvard Law School and McGill University
for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
Many of the ideas in this essay have been developed in the course of a decade-long collaboration
with Charles Goetz. I am obliged, therefore, to share with Goetz the credit for any insights the
Article contributes. The errors are all mine.
A version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium on The Complex Long-
Term Contract, held on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the University of Heidelberg,
Heidelberg, Germany, October 24, 1986.
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INTRODUCTION
The law governing long-term contracts appears to be in disarray.
Inconsistent application of the legal doctrines of commercial impractica-
bility and frustration by courts betrays widespread judicial confusion
over the proper conditions for excusing or adjusting the obligations of
parties to long-term contracts.' Similar uncertainties frustrate attempts
to prescribe regular meanings for key contractual formulations such as
good faith adjustment2 and force majeure.3 This doctrinal confusion is
symptomatic of a deeper conceptual uncertainty: What is the proper role
of legal rules in the regulation of long-term contractual relationships?
The tensions that underlie the legal regulation of long-term con-
tracts have been particularly evident in recent years. Many contractual
breakdowns were triggered by the sudden inflation of energy prices dur-
ing the past decade. The resulting litigation has revealed the apparent
inadequacy of existing common law responses. Courts offer only two
alternatives: Enforce fully the initial risk distribution scheme or excuse
1. Compare Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978)
(equitable adjustment denied), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 911 (1980) and Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct.
App.) (adjustment of outmoded price escalator index refused), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979) with
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (price adjustment
mechanism reformed due to "mutual mistake").
The most curious aspect of the commercial impracticability cases decided over the past 20 years
has been the courts' steadfast refusal to grant excuse for nonperformance despite the apparent
invitation to do so in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Second Restatement. See U.C.C. § 2-
615 and comment 1 (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-266 (1981); cases
cited in Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, 5 CORP. L. REv. 195, 207-16 (1982).
For a discussion of the relationship between judicial attitudes and the complexity of the issues in
excuse cases, see A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 415-18, 427-28, 449-57
(1982); see also Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2-20 (1976) (discussing
issues such as foreseeability, harshness of seller's burden, windfall gains, and causation).
2. Good faith adjustment clauses (also known as "renegotiation" or "gross inequities"
clauses) are contractual provisions that require a common effort of the parties to agree, for various
reasons, to a substantial, material change of the contractual allocation of risks. These clauses
authorize changes in a contract without following any automatic or predetermined pattern. See W.
PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
153-55 (1986). A typical example includes the following language: "In case of profound change in
the circumstances..., the parties, at the request of any one of them, will consult together for the
purpose of considering such changes in this... [a]greement as the parties deem to be appropriate."
Id. at 155 (quoting a 1974 supplemental agreement to a 1960 "LAMCO" Iron-Ore Agreement).
Despite the frequent use of adjustment clauses in long-term contracts, it remains unclear whether,
and to what extent, they are legally enforceable. See infra text accompanying notes 147 & 148.
3. "Force majeure" has been held to include: "all circumstances independent of the will of
man, and which it is not in his power to control, and such force majeure is sufficient to justify the
non-execution of a contract. Thus, war, inundations, and epidemics are cases of force majeure; [as
is] a strike of workmen." Lebeaupin v. Richard Crispin & Co., [1920] 2 K.B. 714, 719 (quoting L.
GOIRAND, A TREATISE UPON FRENCH COMMERCIAL LAW 854 (2d ed. 1898). Standard force
majeure provisions deal adequately with these routine situations but appear unable to allocate the
risks of "economic" contingencies, such as an oil embargo or an unstable labor force. See infra text
accompanying notes 144-46.
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the adversely affected performance entirely.4 An increasingly lively aca-
demic debate has centered on the single normative question of when, if
ever, courts should intervene to equitably adjust the risks of long-term
contracting.5
There are several reasons why this key question remains unresolved.
In the first place, we lack a workable theory of contractual behavior to
illuminate the decisionmaking strategies parties use to accommodate the
stresses and tensions that threaten their relationship. Parties enter into
continuing contractual relationships in order to exploit the economic
benefits of long-term planning and coordination. Even so, contingencies
may later materialize and frustrate the parties' efforts to realize these
shared objectives. Anticipating this, contracting parties must distribute
between themselves the risks of their enterprise.
Although there are a wide variety of risk-bearing options, all com-
mercial contractors have two dominant motivations. Initially, the parties
wish to distribute risks in the least burdensome way. Thereafter, parties
seek to adjust initial risk assignments in light of subsequent events so as
to realize greater benefits from their joint enterprise. These risk distribu-
tion and adjustment objectives are highly interactive and frequently in
conflict. The resulting tension is thus an inevitable consequence of the
fundamental incompatibility between the desire to reduce the collective
burden of risk bearing and the desire to adjust individual responsibilities
over time.
Developing a model of contractual behavior is further complicated
by the interactions between the legal and social norms that regulate con-
tinuing contractual relationships.6 This Article aims only at a beginning.
4. But see Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason,
58 Nw. U.L. REv. 750 (1964); Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 250 (1980);
Daube, The Scales of Justice, 63 JURID. REV. 109 (1951).
5. The legal scholarship on long-term contracting has tended to focus on either the risk
distribution objective or the adjustment objective, but not both. Thus, many of the insights of the
recent scholarship are flawed by analyses that are insufficiently comprehensive. For a review of the
issues and of the best commentary in the academic debate, see Gillette, Commercial Rationality and
the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1985); Goldberg, Price Adjustments
in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 527; Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 573 (1983); Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts." An Analysis Under Modern
Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1; Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-Classical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.
854 (1978); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term
Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 369 (1981) [hereinafter Speidel, Court-Imposed Price
AdjustmentsJ; Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts about Risk
Management, 32 S.C.L. REV. 241 (1980) [hereinafter Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance];
Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV.
471 (1985).
6. See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
1987] 2007
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My purpose is to advance the normative debate by using the techniques
of modem decision analysis and game theory; first to clarify the relation-
ship between the risk distribution and adjustment functions of contract;
and then to suggest how legal rules can function to ameliorate tensions in
efforts to reallocate risks.
In Part I of the Article, I develop a conceptual framework for ana-
lyzing the decisionmaking strategies of parties to long-term commercial
contracts. Because no strategy can efficiently distribute the risk of all
contingencies at the time of contracting, parties agree-either explicitly
or implicitly-to adjust their initial risk allocation scheme in order to
accommodate subsequent events. Unhappily, once contract risks are ini-
tially distributed, each party has less incentive to accommodate the
other's subsequent request for adjustment. Each party thus confronts,
repeatedly, a difficult choice: whether to adjust cooperatively (as origi-
nally agreed) or to respond to immediate self-interest and evade the
responsibility.
Obviously, if parties can costlessly renegotiate the distribution of
risks, a cooperative adjustment will be achieved.7 But how do parties
respond to the adjustment choice when they are effectively precluded
from bargaining? By visualizing the interactions between contracting
parties as a strategic interaction game, we can better understand how
nonbargained reciprocal patterns regulate contractual behavior. A game
theory model suggests that two opposing and polar behavioral patterns
would emerge if parties were unable to bargain over adjustment. Many
parties, motivated by the prospect of future interactions, would develop
patterns of cooperative adjustment despite their inability to renegotiate
the risk assignments. Unfortunately, the same forces that promote stable
patterns of cooperation would also reinforce a counterpattern of exploita-
tion and conflict.' To resolve this indeterminacy, I then add the more
realistic assumption that the parties, although precluded from negotiat-
ing each adjustment option, are nevertheless able to communicate their
intentions to each other. Under these conditions, I conclude, a coopera-
tive equilibrium will result eventually whenever one of the parties
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw.
U.L. REv. 340 (1983); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
7. See generally R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 88, 104 (1984) (discussing
the evolution of cooperative patterns and their resistance to noncooperative behaviors); see also infra
note 54 and accompanying text.
8. This does not imply that the renegotiated agreement will be socially optimal. The terms of
the renegotiation, as well as the parties' incentives to take precautions to prevent breakdowns, will
depend on a number of other variables including the legal remedies for breach of contract. See
Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, (forthcoming, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. (1988).
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"precommits" to a strategy of conditional cooperation prior to the first
adjustment.
In Part II, I relax the assumptions of the model in order to examine
the dynamics of risk allocation and adjustment in more realistic contrac-
tual environments. Under these conditions, substantial problems of
information and enforcement appear to upset efforts to realize a coopera-
tive equilibrium. However, parties in continuing relationships are able to
invoke use and contractual mechanisms to reduce these information and
enforcement deficits. In addition, recourse to legal mechanisms seems to
strengthen the existing matrix of social and contractual norms. The par-
ties can assign the various risks of the enterprise more clearly because
they can use standardized terms that have been blessed with legal mean-
ings. Moreover, the ongoing process of adjustment is enhanced by hav-
ing legal means to deter large-scale defections from the cooperative
norm. Unfortunately, however, recourse to the legal system generates off-
setting costs. The limits of legal and extralegal regulation thus suggest
that occasional breakdowns in emerging patterns of mutual cooperation
are inevitable.
The highly interactive nature of the parties' response to problems of
noncooperation makes the effects of any legally imposed adjustment
largely unpredictable. Adjusting losses coercively may sometimes be
consistent with the cooperative strategies the parties have developed.
But, equally likely, courts may fail to perceive that a particular non-
cooperative response is necessary in order to preserve the general cooper-
ative equilibrium. I conclude, therefore, that the existing foundation of
highly complex social and contractual norms requires broad party auton-
omy in selecting, ex ante, the best complement of legal devices to miti-
gate information and enforcement deficiencies. These customized
mechanisms, together with the "discipline of continuous dealings,"9 will
generate stable patterns of mutual cooperation in most contracts.
I
A COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
BEHAVIOR
A. Limits of the Bargain Model
The bargain theory of contract has dominated American jurispru-
9. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH oF NATIONS 700 (E. Cannon ed. 1937) (1776). Ian Macneil has
written: "[My] students all ... know that I invented relational contract, and I daresay Stewart
Macaulay's students all know that he invented relational contract." Macneil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483, 483. Amazingly, my students all know that
Goetz and I invented relational contract. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981). But as the quotation in the text reveals, each of us was anticipated, as
in all things, by another Scot, Adam Smith.
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dence for well over one hundred years. The modem conceptualization of
that paradigm extends to hypothetical bargains as well. This approach
evaluates legal rules by asking what set of arrangements the affected par-
ties would have adopted had they bargained over such issues in advance.
Whether in classical or contemporary form, the remarkable durability of
the bargain theory rests on a single idea: contracting parties can (and do)
agree explicitly on how the risks of their enterprise should be distributed.
But many private contracts do not easily fit the presuppositions of
the classical bargain analysis. In relational contexts, where the future
contingencies are complex and uncertain, the bargain theory generates
two forms of bias. First, bargain theory ignores the barriers to executory
contracting, or ex ante bargaining, that characterize many contractual
settings. There is mounting social science evidence that individuals make
systematic errors in their cognitive judgments and decisions: errors that
impair their ability to achieve fully a desired objective through executory
bargains.'" Second, bargain theory ignores the significant barriers to
renegotiation, or ex post bargaining, that exist in many contractual rela-
tionships. Despite the physical proximity of the parties or their techno-
logical capacity to interact, strategic considerations frequently block the
disclosure of information necessary to any renegotiation. Because, these
bargaining impediments influence the structure of the ongoing contrac-
tual relationship, they need to be explicitly included in any model of con-
tractual behavior.
Parties generally enter into long-term contracts only after consider-
ing alternative methods of achieving their objectives. One obvious alter-
native is vertically integrating several activities into a single firm. Parties
may choose vertical integration if the benefits of central management
exceed the cost of monitoring within the firm. In many commercial set-
tings, however, vertical integration is not a feasible option.1
Another alternative is sequential, rather than long-term, con-
tracting. By negotiating a series of recurring short-term contingent con-
tracts, the parties can often reduce the barriers to bargaining that might
otherwise impair the relationship.12 Unfortunately, the performance of
10. See Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decision-Making: An Essay on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329,
332-47 (1986).
11. A number of factors may make vertical integration less attractive than alternative
contractual forms. These factors are not all related to production efficiencies and transaction costs.
For instance, vertical integration may trigger costly forms of governmental regulation including
workers' compensation, social security, and labor law regulations. See Goldberg, The Law and
Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEx. L. REv. 91, 120 (1979).
12. By arbitrarily constraining the duration of the contract, the parties can reduce both the
uncertainty regarding the magnitude of future contingencies and the complexity of assigning these
risks. So long as the performance of such short-term contracts does not create contract-specific
investments, the problem of strategic bargaining will not arise upon renegotiation because each party
2010 [Vol. 75:2005
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the initial agreement will often require specialized, contract-specific
investments by both parties. As investments mount, each party becomes
vulnerable to strategic demands by the other when the contract is period-
ically renegotiated. The threat of strategic or opportunistic behavior
will, in turn, reduce each party's incentive to exploit fully the benefits of
long-term planning and coordination. In many circumstances, therefore,
the combination of the parties' desire to secure the benefits of long-term
planning and investment, and their inability otherwise to reduce the vul-
nerability that such investment necessarily creates, will induce the parties
to restrict themselves mutually by a long-term contract.
Imagine that two commercial parties have elected to enter into a
long-term contract because they consider this arrangement more attrac-
tive than the available alternatives. Once this fundamental choice is
made, the parties must consider the more vexing question of how to
reduce the tensions inherent in long-term relationships. These tensions
are an inevitable consequence of the incompatibility between the objec-
tives of ex ante risk distribution and ex post adjustment.
Acoa v. Essex"3 offers a useful illustration of the challenges our two
parties will confront. The contract between Alcoa and Essex required
Alcoa to convert Essex's alumina into molten aluminum for a twenty-
year period. In turn, Essex agreed to purchase up to forty million
pounds of alumina per year from Alcoa. The initial contract price was
fifteen cents per pound. This consisted of a fixed "demand" charge and a
"production" charge that included an adjustable component for non-
labor and labor costs. The non-labor costs were indexed to the wholesale
price index and the labor costs to Alcoa's average hourly labor costs.
The parties agreed to a ceiling price of 65% percent of the posted price of
a specified type of aluminum.
The contractual relationship between Alcoa and Essex was severely
strained when production costs rose dramatically in response to drastic
increases in fuel prices in 1973. Adjustments in the contract price of alu-
minum did not keep pace with the rapidly increasing cost of producing it.
The major cause of the discrepancy was the rise in nonlabor production
costs that rose more than twice as rapidly as the wholesale price index.4
By 1979, Essex was receiving aluminum from Alcoa at 36 cents per
pound and reselling it on the open market at 73 cents per pound.
Alcoa repeatedly attempted to renegotiate the contract with Essex.
But all efforts to secure a voluntary adjustment failed. Ultimately, Alcoa
can use the market to monitor the value of its performance. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at
1100-02.
13. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
14. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 534-40 (synthesis of facts derived from the published
decision and the briefs).
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refused to produce under the contract and the dispute went to trial. The
trial court ruled that the nonlabor production index was a "mutual mis-
take" because it operated so badly. Rescission, however, would result in
a windfall for Alcoa and deprive Essex of the benefits of its long-term
contract. Accordingly, the court instead reformed the contract, rewriting
the price term to insure Alcoa at least one cent per pound "profit."1
Clearly, the parties to the Alcoa-Essex contract encountered unan-
ticipated problems, despite having received sophisticated legal and eco-
nomic advice. 6 Relational theory suggests two possible reasons why the
relationship between the parties broke down. First, the inability of the
parties to specify an effective price adjustment mechanism may reflect
heretofore unrecognized obstacles that prevent parties from successfully
allocating risks at the time of contracting. Second, the parties' inability
to modify the contract in light of subsequent events suggests that addi-
tional barriers to renegotiation may also have contributed to the failure
of the relationship.
The existing framework of legal regulations is generally considered
insufficient for addressing these problems.' 7 Thus, in the aftermath of
Alcoa, academic commentary has focused on the desirability of court-
imposed adjustments in long-term contracts. 8 Unfortunately, this com-
mentary fails to appreciate all of the forces that shape long-term contrac-
tual relationships. Before prematurely embracing court-imposed
solutions the legal community must first comprehend the decisionmaking
strategies parties such as Alcoa and Essex pursue in trying to overcome
the impediments to maintaining long-term relationships.
B. Barriers to Ex Ante Bargaining: The Limits of Risk Allocation
Under Uncertainty
1. Strategies for Distributing Risk
The dynamics of relational contracting are rich and multifaceted.
Clarifying this complex process necessarily requires some abstraction in
order to isolate the variables that most influence contracting behavior.
To this end, I will assume initially that the probabilities and magnitudes
of all exogenous contingencies (such as the risk of flood or earthquake)
will remain constant through the duration of the contract.' 9 Thus, the
15. Id. at 535.
16. See id. at 537-40.
17. See, eg., Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L.
Rv. 1 (1984); Gillette, supra note 5, at 522; Goldberg, supra note 5, at 528; Harrison, supra note 5,
at 581; Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 5, at 241; Stroh, supra note 1, at 210;
Trakman, supra note 5, at 471.
18. See, eg., Goldberg, supra note 5, at 537-40; Hillman, supra note 5 at 4-17; Speidel, Court-
Imposed Price Adjustments, supra note 5, at 377-80.
19. In other words, I assume that the parties attempt an initial risk-allocation strategy based
2012 [Vol. 75:2005
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parties' chief concern is how to allocate endogenous risks; for example,
decisions about planting crops, building structures, or storing inventory.
Even with this limiting assumption, it is not obvious how the parties will
initially allocate such contract risks between them. Many of the contin-
gencies that affect supply and demand conditions over the life of a long-
term contract are too complex and uncertain for the parties to predict
their likelihood or scope. Nevertheless, for certain contingencies a
probability distribution over the possible "states of nature" is known--or
the parties decide to act as if it were known. A logical place to begin,
therefore, is to ask how contracting parties such as Alcoa and Essex
might distribute the risk of such "foreseeable" contingencies.
Imagine that at the time they contracted both Alcoa and Essex
know that certain "natural" variations in the quality of aluminum can be
reduced, but only if special precautions are taken by Alcoa at the initial
stage of processing. Assume further that both parties are risk neutral;
they care about the expected value of a loss but not its distribution. The
parties thus confront a situation in which one party or the other can act
in a way that alters the objective amount of risk in the world. When such
actions are cost-beneficial, there is a potential gain to both parties if they
can assign the entire risk of quality variations to the party best able to
influence the amount of the risk.2'
Using this strategy of risk control, the parties would allocate the
entire risk of variations in the quality of aluminum to Alcoa. The advan-
tage of this simple risk- assignment technique derives from Alcoa's abil-
ity to control the production process and other details of its own
performance. As the party in control of the contracted performance,
Alcoa is better able to undertake cost-effective precautions that will
reduce the probability of quality variations.2
It is tempting to argue that contracting parties such as Alcoa and
Essex might profit from a more sophisticated risk reduction strategy.22
For instance, in seeking the superior risk bearer, the parties might con-
sider a variety of additional variables, such as relative access to informa-
tion concerning the likely impact of any risk or ability to obtain third-
party insurance against the risk. Ultimately, however, the benefits of risk
control can be realized fully only by allocating foreseeable risks to the
on the premise that subsequent events will not alter their current assessment of the various risks and
their probabilities. This assumption is explicitly relaxed later in the discussion.
20. C. GoETz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 127 (1984).
21. For an elaboration of this argument, see Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 578-83 (1977).
22. See, eg., Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 90-92 (arguing for the relevance of
insurance and other transaction costs in allocating the risk of nonperformance). But see Bruce, An
Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 320-23 (1982) (criticizing
Posner & Rosenfield).
1987] 2013
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party whose performance is thereby affected. To see why this is so,
assume that the parties assign the risk of quality variations to Essex
based upon their calculation that Essex has better information concern-
ing the impact of changes in product quality or can more readily secure
third-party insurance. This arrangement will necessarily motivate Alcoa
to underinvest in precautions to minimize the variance in product qual-
ity. Even if Essex were to attempt to exploit its advantage as the cheaper
insurer, insurance costs necessarily would be greater because Essex lacks
control over Alcoa's precautionary investments.23
This conclusion may be generalized to all cases in which a party has
some control over the probability of externally caused nonperformance.
If the risk bearer believes that it possesses inadequate information to cal-
culate the appropriate precautions, it need only request this information
from the other party. Any failure to provide the requested information
would be grounds for avoiding the risk assignment. Indeed, damage lim-
itation rules such as Hadley v. Baxendale24 encourage such an informa-
tion exchange; enabling the risk bearer to calculate the likely impact of
any foreseeable contingencies.25
In addition to the parties' control over risk, their subjective prefer-
ences for risk may also dictate allocation. This is the strategy of risk
transfer: reducing risks merely by reallocating the consequences of a
risk. Assume, for example, that there is a difference in the risk prefer-
ences of Alcoa and Essex; they attach different subjective values to what
is objectively the same risk. If the risk is not already allocated to the
party who places the lowest monetary cost on it, then a transfer to that
party, together with a compensatory payment to the risk bearer, will be
mutually advantageous. Risk transfer thus reduces risk costs when an
otherwise unchanged risk is allocated to a person who, if only for psycho-
logical reasons, attaches a lower money value to the risk.26
It is important to recognize that reduction in the subjective cost of
risk through risk transfer is a very real reduction in cost. Nevertheless,
several factors suggest that such transfers will not consistently be avail-
able as a risk distribution strategy. In the first place, the transaction
costs of effecting the transfer may diminish or even overcome the poten-
tial gain. Furthermore, the mere fact that the two parties have different
utility functions does not guarantee a difference in risk preference. It is
23. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 578-83.
24. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); see generally Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 1012-15 (1983) (proposing
that Hadley v. Baxendale be extended "to all those particular needs of which an obligee is unaware,
if the obligor has reason to know of them at any time before performance is tendered." Id. at 1014).
25. See Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
L.J. 1261, 1298-1300 (1980).
26. See C. GoETz, supra note 20, at 123-27.
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the relative difference in the intensity of feeling gains and losses that pro-
duces risk preference.27
Risk control and risk transfer are complementary, binary strategies;
they reduce risks by allocating the entire risk to one party or the other.
The initial allocation question becomes considerably more complex, how-
ever, when the parties also consider alternative, noncomplementary strat-
egies. One such strategy is risk sharing. Risk sharing occurs when each
party accepts a portion of an unchanged set of risks. If the contingencies
are uncertain and both parties are risk averse, a risk-sharing scheme will
reduce the amount of uncertainty and thus reduce the cost of the risk for
each party.2 8 Risk-averse parties benefit from a risk-sharing arrangement
because it reduces the variance in risk; each has a higher probability of
incurring a smaller future loss.
A common method of risk sharing is a price-adjustment mechanism
such as that in the Alcoa-Essex contract. Price-adjustment arrangements
reduce the variance between potential gains and losses and thus advance
risk-sharing goals. Similarly, a liquidated damage clause, in which dam-
ages for particular contingencies are specified in advance, serves a risk-
sharing as well as a risk-control purpose.2 9
2. Making Risk-Distribution Choices Under Uncertainty
In selecting a risk-bearing strategy, the parties must balance the
expected gains from risk reduction against several categories of costs. Of
particular relevance are the costs of negotiating the initial distribution
scheme and the costs of subsequently monitoring and enforcing the
assignments as contingencies occur.30
While calculations cannot be precise, each of these cost considera-
tions tend to support binary strategies-those that allocate entire risks to
one party or the other-over risk-sharing alternatives. Negotiating a
risk-sharing contract requires complex bargaining to reach agreement on
vexing distributional questions. On the other hand, binary risk-alloca-
tion strategies are easier to adopt because they depend on discernable
27. Id.
28. See Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427,
429-33 (1983).
29. Id. at 436.
30. On the relationship between risk-bearing choices and various categories of transaction
costs, see Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12
J. L. & ECON. 23, 36-41 (1969) (transaction costs of short-term leases); Umbeck, A Theory of
Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 1 L. & ECON. 421, 422-28 (1977) (transaction
costs in mining contracts). The tension between risk-allocation choices and the subsequent costs of
maintaining the parties' incentives to perform is discussed in the economics literature. See, e.g.,
Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121, 146-47 (1984)
(benefits of specific performance weighed against parties' risk-bearing abilities in relation to the type
of contract).
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cognitive heuristics such as the criterion of risk-control.3 Although sub-
ject to bias, these heuristics are entrenched in individual behavior pre-
cisely because they simplify decisionmaking.32 For instance, historic
facts provide a simple mechanism for applying a strategy of risk con-
trol.33 If historic facts reveal that the seller cannot efficiently reduce the
probabilities of exogenous events such as labor strikes and embargoes,
the parties can use a force majeure clause to assign those risks to the
buyer.34
Moreover, the cost of measuring and dividing the contractual prod-
uct will be higher under a risk-sharing scheme. In general, the problems
of measurement and division of responsibility increase with the complex-
ity of the contract. 35  Because risk-sharing arrangements are inevitably
more complex than binary allocations, evasions of contractual responsi-
bilities are more difficult to detect and to police.36 As a result, the cost of
31. For a review of the literature and a discussion of the relevance of cognitive heuristics to
legal theory, see Scott, supra note 10; see also JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY]; D. VON WINTERFELDT & W. EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH 533-47 (1986); Abelson & Levi, Decision Making and Decision Theory, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d ed. 1985).
32. Scott, supra note 10, at 361-62.
33. For an argument that contracting parties derive their probability assessments principally
through analysis of historic facts, see Narasimhan, OfExpectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the
Bargain Principle, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1123, 1142-49 (1986). The use of historic facts is illustrative of
the "representativeness" and "availability" heuristics. Individuals using the "representativeness"
heuristic make probability assessments based on the assumption that the probability that object A
belongs to class B is determined by the degree to which A resembles B. See JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 31, at 32-33. The "availability" heuristic is a strategy for assessing
probability based upon how readily prior instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. See id. at
190-92; Scott, supra note 10, at 335.
34. A force majeure provision exempts the performing party from responsibility for those
exogenous risks he cannot control. See generally A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTr, supra note 1, at 439-56
(1982) (cases and commentary on the role of exculpatory clauses in assigning risk).
A standard force majeure clause includes the following:
The term "force majeure" shall be deemed to include acts of God, fire, acts of civil or
military authorities, acts of war, riots, insurrection, orders of court or regulatory agencies,
strikes, lockouts or other industrial disturbances, breakage of or accidents to machinery,
and any other cause, whether of the kind enumerated or otherwise, not within the control
of the party claiming suspension of its obligations, and which by the exercise of due
diligence such party is unable to avoid. It is understood and agreed that the settlement of
strikes and labor disputes shall be entirely within the discretion of the party affected
thereby.
Young, Construction and Enforcement of Long-Term Coal Supply Agreements-Coping With Condi-
tions Arising From Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Events-Force Majeure and Gross Inequities
Clauses, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 127, 140 (1980); see also MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-617
(1972). See generally Kirkham, Force Majeure-Does It Really Work, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 6-1 (1984) (discussing the meaning and utility of force majeure clauses).
35. See Umbeck, supra note 30, at 422-28.
36. Cf Erlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking. 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1974) (applying a similar analysis to tort law; addressing the difficulty of monitoring in complex
arrangements).
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enforcement is higher with risk-sharing agreements than where the par-
ties distribute risks through "all or nothing" rules.
Although a binary strategy is generally cheaper than risk sharing, its
benefits decline sharply where risks depend on interactive or interdepen-
dent contingencies."' To be sure, contracting parties can sometimes
make a binary assignment even without understanding the relationship
among particular contingencies. Consider, for example, how the hypo-
thetical contracting parties might assign the risk of increases in nonlabor
production costs. The parties may not be able to estimate the independ-
ent effects of any particular contingency (for example, the extent to
which disturbances among energy-producing nations might increase
energy costs). Nevertheless, they still may be able to aggregate all the
contingencies that affect nonlabor inputs by assigning the entire risk of
such cost increases to the seller; the party who controls the production
process.
In many instances, however, the comparative advantage in risk
bearing is divided between the parties. Thus, for example, the risk of
increases in production costs may depend on several interactive variables
such as the inverse relationship between energy costs and the demand for
various factors of production. The seller may have a superior ability to
bear the risk of the first contingency, but the buyer may be better able to
plan for the second. A risk-control strategy will not work because,
regardless of how the parties define the "risk," neither party will enjoy an
advantage in estimating both its probability and its likely impact. If the
parties are unable to separate the contingencies, neither party can take
cost-effective precautions independently. 8
The limits of binary strategies in reducing the risk of interactive con-
37. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 275-78 (1957). The term
"contingency" is used here to refer to an event that might trigger a risk.
38. Contracting parties can attempt to solve this dilemma by selecting among well-known
criteria for making decisions under conditions of ignorance. See generally R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA,
supra note 37, at 275-309 (discussing decision problems under uncertainty and evaluating various
criteria for making choices); Arrow, Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking
Situations, 19 ECONOMETRICA 404 (1951) (a survey of theories of choice in the face of uncertain
consequences).
However, these criteria are often impractical to implement and can lead to undesirable results.
For example, the "maximin" criteria (minimizing the maximum risk of loss) are extremely
pessimistic-they require parties to ignore potential advantages of optimistic choices. See R. LUCE
& H. RAIFFA, supra note 37, at 278-83; Chernoff, Rational Selection of Decision Functions, 22
ECONOMETRICA 422, 424-26 (1954). More balanced approaches take account of optimistic choices
by assigning a probability distribution to possible outcomes. However, these approaches require that
the parties specify a mutually exclusive and exhaustive list of possible outcomes. Depending on the
criterion used and differences in the lists of plausible future contingencies, different or intuitively
unreasonable solutions may result. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 37, at 282-86; D. VON
WINTERFELDT & W. EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 109-10. The difficulties with all these decision
criteria are further magnified when the choice must be made in a bargaining context.
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tingencies suggest that the contracting parties will consider other means
to reduce the burdens of risk bearing. If the parties are risk averse, they
can alter the precontract distribution of possible outcomes through risk
sharing. Risk sharing reduces the uncertainty associated with interactive
contingencies. This, in turn, reduces each party's subjective cost of risk
bearing.39 By hedging against the consequences of an uncertain world,
both parties can raise their security levels and thereby reduce risk-bear-
ing costs.
3. Implications of the Distribution Dilemma
Two tentative implications for ex ante bargaining follow from this
analysis of risk allocation under uncertainty. First, we might predict that
parties to long-term contracts would employ a mixed strategy for distrib-
uting risk. Binary allocations should be preferred whenever the contin-
gencies are severable and the risks can be assessed individually. Risk-
sharing arrangements should be preferred where the contingencies are
too interactive to make such individual precautions meaningful.40
Casual observation confirms this initial prediction. In Alcoa, for
example, many of the risks of contracting were borne entirely by one
party or the other. The risk of quality variations, inadequate production
capacity, and inventory shortages were all borne by the seller. Parallel
risks affecting the demand for aluminum were borne by the buyer. Con-
versely, the uncertain effects of exogenous variables on endogenous pro-
duction costs stimulate the search for a more complex pricing
mechanism. The design of adjustable charges for nonlabor and labor
inputs allowed the parties to share the risk of certain supply and demand
contingencies.
The hypothesis that parties will pursue mixed strategies for distrib-
uting risk may also explain why courts have encountered such difficulty
in applying the exculpatory doctrines of commercial frustration and
impracticability. Courts have relied on the ex ante foreseeability of the
contingency in determining whether to excuse an obligor from a burden-
some performance. 41 Foreseeability, however, is irrelevant to the choice
39. For discussions of the impact of risk aversion on contract choice, see Kornhauser, An
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 705-07
(1986).
40. There are, of course, some circumstances in which a "mixed" strategy for distributing risks
will not be necessary. Some parties, perhaps such as Alcoa and Essex, can diversify internally, by
entering into many long-term contracts with different partners. Under these conditions, they would
not require a sharing rule in order to diversify risks. Such internal risk diversification could also
occur by using a combination of short-term and long-term contracts.
41. Using the foreseeability test, the courts, with virtual unanimity, have rejected sellers'
claims for relief from a performance that became more costly owing to an intervening contingency.
See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 140 (N.D. Iowa 1978)
(52.2% cost increase due to oil embargo and unexpected federal regulations held insufficient to
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between the binary alternatives of complete excuse or full performance.
Indeed, the contingencies that justify excuse will always be foreseeable.
After all, a rule excusing a burdensome performance is simply an implied
force majeure provision that allocates the entire risk of a particular con-
tingency to the buyer. Such a rule is the preferred strategy only in cases
involving a known contingency that is beyond the seller's effective con-
trol.42 If the contingency is truly "unforeseeable," such that its probabili-
ties or its effects cannot be assessed, then a risk-sharing rule generally
will be preferred to either extreme of excuse or strict performance; par-
ties would agree to excuse performance completely only in cases where
the risks are, in fact, foreseeable. Given the decisionmaking strategies
suggested by this analysis, therefore, the foreseeability test is
incoherent.43
The second and potentially more important implication of the anal-
ysis is that, regardless of the parties' efforts, the initial risk-distribution
process will virtually always require adjustment to accommodate subse-
quent events. Even if a risk-allocation strategy is initially successful,
subsequent events inevitably present opportunities for further improve-
ments. Unfortunately, contracting parties cannot anticipate every adjust-
ment that will be required. Furthermore, they cannot rely upon any
metastrategy for selecting among different decision criteria over time. To
be sure, when concerns about risk-allocation errors are sufficiently acute,
the parties can always abandon the goal of long-term contracting and
instead rely upon short-term or sequential contracts. But those parties
who nonetheless anticipate substantial net economies from long-term
contracting will instead be motivated to rely on crude, temporizing
approximations of their risk-reduction objectives. Whether these initial
assignments will be appropriately adjusted in response to subsequent
events thus depends on how those events affect the parties' relationship.
C. Barriers to Ex Post Bargaining: The Adjustment Dilemma
I assumed initially that the probability of any event or the magni-
excuse seller's performance), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 911 (1980); Publicker Indus. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989,
992 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (75% cost increase allegedly resulting from OPEC cartel held insufficient to
excuse seller); Eastern Airlines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 43942 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (cost
increases created by OPEC boycott, energy crisis, and federal controls were reasonably foreseeable);
Center Garment Co. v. United Refrigerator Co., 369 Mass. 633, 637, 341 N.E.2d 669, 673 (1976)
(failure of expected source of supply was foreseeable contingency borne by seller); Barbarossa &
Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, 265 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Minn. 1978) (same); see also cases discussed in
Stroh, supra note 1, at 210-14.
42. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
43. For a further discussion of the difficulties of the foreseeability test, see Sirianni, The
Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility: Part I, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 30, 55-65
(1981).
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tude of its consequences remains constant throughout the contractual
relationship. I now relax that assumption in order to analyze the influ-
ence of changing circumstances on the parties' contractual behavior.
The seller and buyer face new problems as time passes and conditions
change. Inevitably some contingencies become more (or less) probable,
while others that were beyond calculation become more clear. Conse-
quently, the initial risk allocation no longer represents the parties' best
response to future contingencies.
Assume, for example, that Alcoa's production costs increase unex-
pectedly after 90% of the contract aluminum has been produced. If the
parties can agree to adjust the contract quantity in light of these subse-
quent events they will reduce the joint cost of contracting. Once the con-
tract has been made, however, Essex has little interest in voluntarily
adjusting the contract to help reduce Alcoa's excess costs. But if Alcoa
anticipates bearing excess costs, it will negotiate for a higher price to
compensate for these additional costs. Both parties will gain if they agree
in advance to adjust the initial risk assignments so as to reduce expected
future costs." Thus, both parties will probably adopt a broad statement
of cooperative adjustment if they attempt to cope with this dilemma at
all. The resulting risk-sharing agreement (which can take the form of a
"good faith adjustment," "gross inequities," or "renegotiation" clause)45
44. Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 973.
45. Casual empiricism confirms the prevalence of renegotiation and other adjustment clauses
in long-term contracts. These clauses have various designations, including "good faith adjustment,"
"gross inequities," and "market reopener." The unifying feature in all these clauses is the mutual
obligation to adjust risks in light of subsequent events. See, for example, the following unsystematic
sample:
(1) 1976 "OK-Tedi" copper agreement between the Government of Papua New Guinea and
Dampier Mining Co., Ltd. (clause 42):
The parties may from time to time by agreement in writing add to, substitute for, cancel or
vary all or any of the provisions of this Agreement ....
Quoted in W. PETER, supra note 2, at 154-55 (emphasis added by Peter).
(2) 1974 supplemental agreement to the 1960 "LAMCO" iron-ore agreement between the
Republic of Liberia, the Liberian American-Swedish Minerals Co., and Liberia Bethlehem Iron
Mines Co. (paragraph 24):
In case of profound change in the circumstances.., the parties, at the request of any one of
them, will consult together for the purpose of considering such changes in or clarifications
of this Mining Concession Agreement as the parties deem to be appropriate.
Quoted in id. at 155 (emphasis added by Peter).
(3) 1974 "Bougainville Copper" agreement between the Government of Papua New Guinea
and Bougainville Copper Ltd. (clause 28B):
The parties shall co-operate with each other in carrying out the purpose of this Agreement
and shall meet together during the seventh year after the year in which the Amendment
Date occurs .... They shall use their best endeavours to agree upon such changes in the
Agreement as may be requisite.
Quoted in id. at 156.
(4) 1974 petroleum production agreement between the Government of Ghana and Shell Explo-
ration and Production Co. of Ghana (clause 47b):
It is hereby agreed that if during the term of this Agreement there should occur such
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typically will require each contractor to extend whatever efforts are nec-
essary to minimize the joint cost of responding to an adjustment crisis.4 6
But short-term considerations will continue to affect each party's
calculations even after an explicit agreement to adjust risk. Unless rene-
gotiation would be mutually advantageous, the obligee has no interest in
reducing the obligor's costs and has little incentive to convey helpful
information that might facilitate an adjustment. By invoking the adjust-
ment clause, the parties can attempt to reallocate the rights and duties
that have become inefficient because of intervening events.
Unfortunately, renegotiation creates an additional problem: The
obligee may bargain opportunistically in an effort to extract a premium
for its cooperation. Noncooperative bargaining behavior can take a vari-
ety of forms-such as foot dragging or inflating estimates of the cost of
adjustment-that are difficult to challenge directly. Moreover, the obli-
gor may also threaten to evade the assigned responsibility altogether in
order to induce cooperation at the minimum cost.47 Thus, the risk of
exploitation prevents the parties from exchanging the information neces-
sary for cooperative adjustments.48
The problems of renegotiation are acute because the parties will
have become contractually specialized and hence will have substantially
restricted options. Especially when magnified by strategic behavior,
renegotiation costs impede readjustments that offer potential benefits to
both parties. The parties must bargain in a more difficult environment,
one that is likely to contain substantial barriers to negotiation and agree-
ment. In many instances, especially where one party is threatened by
substantial losses, the high cost of renegotiation may preclude effective
bargaining over the appropriate responses to an adjustment
contingency.49
changes in the financial and economic circumstances relating to the petroleum industry,
operating conditions in Ghana and marketing conditions generally as to materially affect
the fundamental economic and financial basis of this Agreement, then the provisions of this
Agreement may be reviewed or renegotiated with a view to making such adjustments and
modifications as may be reasonable having regard to the Operator's capital employed and
the risks incurred by him ....
Quoted in id. at 158.
I analyze prototypical adjustment clauses and the limitations of their standard formulations in
section IID2.
46. Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 973.
47. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 982; Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at 1100-02; Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297, 298-302 (1978); Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 241-42 (1979).
48. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 981-82.
49. An example of the phenomenon of renegotiation impasse may help' to clarify this
argument. Suppose an unanticipated contingency arises (e.g., a price increase in a factor of
production) causing Seller a loss of X. Assume further that loss X could be eliminated by reducing
the quantity supplied under the contract, but that this reduction would cause a loss of Y to Buyer. If
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D. The Contractual Adjustment Process as a Cooperative Game
The following analysis is an abstract formulation of the adjustment
choices facing parties to long-term contracts. It illuminates the regula-
tory power of nonbargained patterns of reciprocal cooperation. In order
to isolate the effects of patterned behavior in maintaining contractual
relationships, I begin by assuming that the parties are completely unable
to bargain. If the parties were absolutely precluded from renegotiating
over adjustment they would find themselves in a classic "prisoner's
dilemma."50 In any given round of prisoner's dilemma, each party must
decide whether or not to cooperate with the other. When both parties
cooperate, each does well. There is, however, both a temptation to defect
while the other party cooperates, producing a high payoff at the other's
expense, and a fear that the other party will adopt a similar line of rea-
soning. Thus, a strict prisoner's dilemma game has a dominant strategy
of noncooperation for at least one of the parties.
While noncooperative outcomes may often occur in contractual
adjustments, they are not inevitable. The parties may still effectively
communicate even where they cannot bargain or renegotiate. For exam-
ple, the parties may engage instead in a game of "chicken," where the
optimal choice between cooperation and noncooperation depends on the
other party's actions. A chicken game involves bluffs or threats of non-
cooperation rather than a fixed noncooperative strategy.
The possibility of communication does not diminish the heuristic
value of the prisoner's dilemma. All of the strategic-interaction games
generate predictable and consistent patterns of noncooperation, patterns
that can nonetheless be transformed to a cooperative equilibrium by con-
tinuous interaction. I will therefore use the prisoner's dilemma as a
generic representation of any strategic-interaction game that results in
systematic and predictable failures to cooperate. The discussion will
X > Y, Seller and Buyer ought to renegotiate-it is in both parties' interest that X - Y be saved.
Unfortunately, bargaining over distribution of the savings may be difficult. Negotiations may also be
impaired because the residual loss ought to be borne by Seller. Furthermore, if no substitute goods
are available elsewhere in the market, Seller may understate the magnitude of X for fear that Buyer
will demand too great a share of the savings.
50. Game theorists have developed the prisoner's dilemma problem to illustrate why, if parties
are unable (for whatever reason) to communicate and bargain, they will systematically choose to
pursue self-interested behavior, even though cooperation could advance their mutual interest. The
mathematician A. W. Tucker initially developed the problem with this scenario: Two prisoners are
charged with the same crime and held in separate cells. If both remain silent they can be convicted
only of a lesser offense and sentenced to one year. However, if one of them confesses, he is set free in
exchange for his cooperation with the prosecutor. The prisoner who has remained silent is convicted
because of the other's testimony and given a five-year sentence. If both confess, they will each be
sentenced to three years. Thus, when one prisoner cannot know what the other will do, his safest
course is to confess. But it is in their collective interest to remain silent.
An extensive literature explores this famous problem. For a general discussion, see R. LucE &
H. RAIFFA, supra note 37, at 94-102.
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show that nonbargained patterns of cooperation can nonetheless develop
in ongoing relationships in which parties have repeated opportunities to
adjust cooperatively. Indeed, parties to long-term contracts can
announce a precommitment to cooperate conditionally and thereby
encourage, even without numerous iterations, stable patterns of coopera-
tive adjustments. In turn, these patterns have powerful effects on real
world contractual interactions where the parties do have the capacity to
bargain.
1. The Prisoner's Dilemma Heuristic
A useful way to evaluate the consequences of barriers to renegoti-
ation is to imagine that these barriers are absolute. Assume that Seller
and Buyer, two large commercial firms, enter into a long-term supply
contract. Subsequently, unanticipated labor problems cause a temporary
increase in Seller's cost of producing the contract goods. If the parties
immediately cooperate (without bargaining) and adjust the contract to
delay delivery for three weeks, each will lose no more than $20,000. But
if Seller evades by claiming that this event falls within the force majeure
clause, it will avoid all losses, and Buyer will lose $50,000. If, on the
other hand, Seller offers to cooperate, but Buyer insists that nonperform-
ance is Seller's responsibility, then Seller will suffer a $50,000 loss, and
Buyer will incur no loss. Finally, if both continue to argue about respon-
sibility, insist that the other is at fault, and ultimately seek a legal settle-
ment, then each-because of increased investment in time and other
costs-will lose $30,000.
Visualizing this adjustment opportunity as a strategic-interaction
game such as a prisoner's dilemma illustrates why parties who are unable
to communicate and bargain will systematically choose to pursue their
perceived self-interest, even though cooperative adjustment would
advance their mutual interest.
FIGURE 1
SELLER BEHAVIOR BUYER BEHAVIOR
ADJUST EVADE
ADJUST -20,000, -20,000 -50,000, 0
EVADE 0, -50,000 -30,000, -30,000
Figure 1 presents the parties' responses to this adjustment problem
in a payoff matrix. Despite the parties' initial commitment to the princi-
ple of cooperative adjustment, a noncooperative outcome will result if the
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parties are unable to bargain face to face or to sign an enforceable agree-
ment. Under these conditions, both parties predictably will act in their
perceived self-interest, which will result in the worst possible outcome
from the perspective of their joint interests. This anomalous result
occurs because neither one can affect the other's choice between adjust-
ment or evasion. Regardless of what the other party does, therefore, eva-
sion is the preferable strategy if one is motivated by self-interest. If Seller
evades and Buyer adjusts unilaterally, Seller loses zero. If Seller and
Buyer both evade, each loses $30,000. Alternatively, adjustment will
cause Seller to lose either $20,000 or $50,000, depending on Buyer's
choice. Since cooperation is less desirable no matter what Buyer does,
Seller chooses evasion. Buyer, facing the same set of choices, makes the
same decisions. Unhappily, therefore, both parties evade their responsi-
bilities, the adjustment requires external intervention, and additional
costs are incurred to resolve the dispute. In consequence, the parties col-
lectively suffer $60,000 in losses, $20,000 more than they would have lost
if they had been able to reach the less costly solution of cooperative
adjustment.
2. The Discipline of Continuous Relations: Patterns
of Conflict and Cooperation
Despite the barriers that preclude bargained-for adjustment, pat-
terns of cooperation can evolve among self-interested actors. 51 Where
Seller and Buyer are in an ongoing relationship, they face adjustment
opportunities repeatedly. When the interaction between the two parties is
iterated, the defecting choice may no longer be the best choice. Because
both parties have a stake in the future, the prospect of future interactions
dramatically changes their adjustment strategies.
To test the potency of the long-term relationship, assume that: The
relative payoffs from cooperation and evasion remain unchanged; neither
party has recourse to legal or social mechanisms to make enforceable
commitments; neither can affect the other's incentives to cooperate or
not; and, neither can reliably predict what the other party will do in any
given adjustment situation.52 Thus, Seller and Buyer can communicate
51. See generally R. AXELROD, supra note 8, at 3-24 (introducing the conditions giving rise to
cooperation in an iterated prisoner's dilemma); sources cited infra notes 55-56.
52. The assumption that the parties are unable to predict each other's actions implies that they
cannot rely on reputations derived from prior adjustment choices or contractual relationships. This
assumption eliminates the "metagame" solution to the prisoner's dilemma in which each player,
armed with a metastrategy of how best to play the game, can predict the move of his opponent and
make the same choice the other is about to make. See N. HOWARD, PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY:
THEORY OF METAGAMES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 60-68 (1971). In Section ID3, I suggest
precommitment as a variation on Howard's metagame solution. I relax the artificial assumption of
total lack of reliable information in the discussion of information and enforcement deficits in Part II.
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only through their individual behavior when each adjustment choice is
presented. Because the contract is long-term, each party retains the abil-
ity to evade or cooperate at subsequent adjustment opportunities. Conse-
quently, in selecting an adjustment strategy, each party must consider
the effect of its choice not only on the immediate conflict but also on later
conflict situations. Thus, the future affects the present choice.
53
Seller and Buyer might initially adopt widely differing decision strat-
egies to meet the challenge of repeated interactions. A party may
attempt to exploit its partner by consistently refusing to cooperate, or,
conversely, it may respond to any action of the other by adjusting coop-
eratively. Alternatively, either party may pursue a responsive or contin-
gent strategy, one that varies between cooperation and evasion depending
upon the actions of the other.54 For example, a strategy based on the
principle of reciprocation, or "tit for tat," begins by cooperating with the
other party when the first adjustment choice is presented, and by emulat-
ing the other's actions in the previous interaction.5
The optimal adjustment strategy in any interaction game of uncer-
tain duration depends on the other party's strategy. Independent of the
other party's strategy, no single method of decision is best. For instance,
if Seller adopts a conciliatory strategy of unconditional cooperation,
Buyer will eventually discover that his best strategy is to evade uncondi-
tionally.56 Alternatively, Buyer should unconditionally cooperate if Seller
intends to cooperate only until the other defects.
Predicting the strategy of the other party is therefore an important
aspect of developing one's own strategy. A good way to predict
53. See R. AXELROD, supra note 8, at 12.
54. There are several classes of contingent strategies. In "state" contingencies, the strategy is
based on a party's response to four possible outcomes in the previous interaction. In "response"
contingencies, the party's strategy is dependent or contingent on the other party's preceding
response. See A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 67-86 (1965).
55. The strategy of tit for tat is both the simplest and the most widely studied of the many
response contingencies. The considerable experimental research on these response contingencies is
summarized and analyzed in Downing, The Prisoner's Dilemma Game as a Problem Solving
Phenomenon: An Outcome Maximization Interpretation, 6 SIMULATION AND GAMES 366 (1975).
See, eg., Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 6-7
(1980) (reporting a computer tournament in which tit for tat strategy won iterated prisoner's
dilemma game); Bixenstine & Gaebelein, Strategies of "Real" Opponents in Eliciting Cooperative
Choice in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 157, 164-65 (1971)
(cooperation enhanced by gradual rather than immediate shift to a 100%-matching response);
Wilson, Reciprocation and Other Techniques for Inducing Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 167, 172-73, 182-83 (1971) (tit for tat achieved greater
cooperation than any other strategy studied).
56. The experimental results of 100%-cooperation strategies are reviewed in Oskamp, Effects
of Programmed Strategies on Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Mixed-Motive Games,
15 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 225, 237-42 (1971). In general, 100% cooperation produced more
defection than a purely responsive tit for tat strategy but less than an aggressive strategy of 20%
cooperation. Id. at 237.
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responses is to assume that each party is trying to promote its own inter-
est and that each believes the other party is intelligent and has similar
goals. Under these circumstances, the parties may eventually learn to
cooperate. In a trial and error process, the parties will eventually cooper-
ate and thereafter be inclined to persist because of the resulting steady
positive payoffs." These payoffs contrast with the highly variant out-
comes that occur when one party cooperates and the other evades. These
outcomes are highly unstable because of the substantial disparity between
one party's loss and the other's gain. Similarly, the harmfulness of the
mutual-defection outcome stimulates the search for better strategies. 58
The dynamics of repeated interactions of indefinite duration suggest,
therefore, that a pattern of cooperative adjustment frequently will
emerge. This prediction does not require that the parties be wholly
rational decisionmakers. It assumes only self-interested behavior played
out in a variety of contexts. Each party adapts through trial and error to
the strategy that seems to work best.59 Seller and Buyer may each begin
by evading adjustment responsibility. Over time, evasive strategies gen-
erate self-defeating "echo" effects, as the parties continually retaliate
against the other's defection. Conversely, if one party begins by adjust-
ing cooperatively and the other responds, mutual cooperation is intro-
duced and then reinforced by a "lock-in" effect.
Empirical studies of cooperative interactions indicate that lock-in
effects are very strong."° These effects tend to make the parties behave
like each other; the tendency is intensified as the interactions continue.
Thus, if a pattern of cooperation can be established initially, a coopera-
tive equilibrium will emerge. Each party's self interest will induce it to
maintain this productive pattern.61
57. Experimental research confirms this theoretical prediction. See Oskamp, supra note 56, at
237-42. Moreover, the experimental research strongly suggests that the patterning of cooperative
responses has an effect independent of the level of cooperation. See id. at 239-42.
58. See A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, supra note 54, at 53-55.
59. From the perspective of sociobiological theory, the manner in which cooperative behavior
emerges is irrelevant if the parties successfully adapt to external constraints. A group of individuals
who cooperate unconditionally will eventually be overrun by nonreciprocating cheaters. Conversely,
unmitigated cheating will undermine any system of reciprocal relationships. Conditional reciprocity
is thus a successful adaptation to the constraints of mixed-motive interactions characterized by both
competition and cooperation. See Krebs & Miller, Altrusion and Aggression, in 2 THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 10-11 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d. ed. 1985); Trivers, The Evolution of
Cooperation, in THE NATURE OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORIES AND
STRATEGIES 43 (D. Bridgeman ed. 1983). For a general discussion of the stability of tit for tat
cooperation in a biological sense, see Axelrod & Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 Sc.
1390 (1981).
60. See A. RAPOPORT AND A. CHAMMAH, supra note 54, at 65.
61. Luce and Raiffa define the cooperative pattern under these conditions as a "quasi-
equilibrium." It is in neither party's interest to initiate the punishing effects of mutual conflict, but
the constant temptation to defect makes the pattern highly unstable. R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra
note 37, at 98.
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Unfortunately, mutual cooperation is not the only entrenched equi-
librium that can emerge from repeated interactions over adjustment
opportunities. An inherent instability exists in any prisoner's dilemma
situation. If one party begins by evading the cooperative responsibility,
the other may respond by retaliating. Retaliation prompts a similar
response, setting off a series of mutual recriminations. The "lock-in"
effect, then, tends to push the parties toward either a stable pattern of
tacit cooperation or the trap of mutual conflict.62
Indeed, there is no a priori reason why cooperation is more likely
than conflict, since both equilibria can be rationalized. The mutual eva-
sion trap seems imminently reasonable since neither party can rationally
justify a unilateral move toward cooperation. For instance, if Seller
cooperates unilaterally, Buyer can take maximum advantage of Seller.
But the parties can also justify the alternative of tacit cooperation. If the
pair has mutually cooperated, neither will resort to evasion because it
would break up the mutually beneficial interactions and result in a harm-
ful cycle of retaliation.63 Realistically, the relative payoffs from coopera-
tive and noncooperative responses will have an important influence on
the outcome. The lower the returns from evasion relative to cooperation,
the greater the probability of a cooperative equilibrium. Conversely,
when the temptations to defect (and associated "sucker payoffs") are
greater, the prospect of mutual conflict increases.
3. A Precommitment Model of Contractual Cooperation
The preceding analysis suggests that repeated interactions between
two parties will often stimulate patterns of mutual cooperation. But the
cooperative outcome is not necessarily more likely than the other
extreme of mutual conflict. This indeterminacy reveals the inherent
instability of the parties' interactions when neither can predict the other's
strategy choices nor influence the ultimate outcome by communicating a
strategic intention to the other.
In a strict prisoner's dilemma, the strategies of the parties are abso-
lute; secret commitments made without communication of intentions or
midstream strategy changes.' 4 Thus, all strategies are equally plausible.
But in long-term contractual relationships, communication plays an
important role even where the parties cannot bargain or renegotiate. In
this environment, the strategies include promises or threats of future con-
62. Paradoxically, once interactive patterns have evolved, they generate an unstable
environment "in which both the tendency to cooperate and to defect are 'self-propelling.'" A.
RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, supra note 54, at 134.
63. Id. at 65.
64. See, eg., Shubik, Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma:
Three Solutions, 14 J. CONLCT RESOLUTION 181, 188 (1970).
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duct. Each party must determine what plausible promises (or threats)
will induce the desired cooperation in the other party.
To understand this situation, we must relax the earlier assumption
that neither party has the ability to predict the other's strategy choices.
Assume, rather, that because the parties communicate, each one knows
that the other can fairly predict the strategy it will choose. The surpris-
ing consequence is that, even without the prospect of repeated interactions,
each party has an incentive not to select the strategy of evasion.65
Recall the adjustment/evasion matrix formulated in Figure 1. If
Seller knows that Buyer will almost surely evade, then Seller will also
evade in order to prevent a $50,000 loss. But if Seller knows that Buyer
plans-at least provisionally-to adjust cooperatively, Seller may exploit
this information by evading and thereby avoid any loss whatsoever.
Given mutual predictability of choices, however, this tactic will fail.
Buyer will anticipate Seller's plans to discontinue cooperative adjust-
ment. Accordingly, Buyer will retaliate and avoid suffering the $50,000
loss by switching to a noncooperative response. Thus, Seller's attempt to
exploit Buyer will fail and instead cause a $30,000 loss for each party.
Since both can predict each other's strategy choices, the temptations to
evade are neutralized, thereby stabilizing the cooperative solution.66
Under conditions of mutual predictability, therefore, either party
can induce a cooperative equilibrium in the very first interaction by
announcing its intention to cooperate conditionally before making an
adjustment choice. The precommitment to cooperate is a reliable prom-
ise; each party knows it cannot, with impunity, suddenly switch strategy
choices once adjustment options are presented. Thus, the responding
party will maximize its respective utility by also cooperating. The
precommitment strategy facilitates the commencement of a cooperative
pattern.67 Thereafter, in an ongoing relationship with repeated interac-
tions, both parties will "lock in" the cooperative equilibrium.
68
The success of precommitment depends upon each party's ability to
predict the other's strategy choice accurately. If a party doubts the accu-
racy of its prediction, it will be tempted to "test" the other's resolve by
occasionally behaving noncooperatively. Immediate retaliation may
seem an overly harsh response to such a test and one unlikely to conveythe initiator's benign intentions. A more conciliatory response--such as
65. Steven Brams first proposed the significance of mutual predictability and the cooperative
solution that it suggests. See Brams, Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners'Dilemma, 19 J. CONLICT
RESOLUTION 596, 603-04 (1975).
66. Id. at 604.
67. Pilisuk & Skolnick, Inducing Trust: A Test of the Osgood Proposal, 8 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 121, 133 (1968).
68. See Wilson, supra note 55, at 186 (discussing the value of precommitment combined with
prompt and consistent reciprocation).
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a gradual or delayed retaliation-may seem more conducive to stable
cooperative interactions. Conciliation, however, creates the risk that the
inducing party's behavior will be incorrectly interpreted as unconditional
unilateral cooperation and thus exploitable by more aggressive behav-
ior.6 9 However well-intentioned it may be, a conciliatory response could
undermine the plausibility of a claimed precommitment to conditional
cooperation. 70 This problem results from the crucial requirement of pre-
dictability. A precommitment strategy requires a party to make its own
behavior predictable and anticipates adjustment from the other.7 1
The propensity to punish evasion must be tempered, however, by an
equivalent propensity to forgive noncooperative behavior. A party com-
mitted to a policy of conditional cooperation retaliates, but returns to a
cooperative response at the next opportunity.72 Viewed ex post, a will-
ingness to continue cooperation despite betrayal might be characterized
69. See R. AXELROD, supra note 8, at 184-87. One of the dangers of being slow to respond to
unprovoked defections is the risk of sending the wrong signal. See infra Section IIAl. For empirical
studies of the consequences of being "slow to anger," see Bixenstine, Potash & Wilson, Effects of
Level of Cooperative Choice by the Other Player on Choices in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, Part I, 66
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 308, 312 (1963); Bixenstine & Wilson, Effects of Level of
Cooperative Choice by the Other Player on Choices in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, Part II, 67 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 139, 147 (1963) (subjects exploited the party who used a highly
cooperative strategy). Research findings generally support the conclusion that "[a] contingent
strategy, such as TFT [tit for tat] matching, produces significantly higher concurrent cooperation
than a noncontingent strategy having the same level of cooperation." Oskamp, supra note 56, at 246.
70. Investigators have studied various conciliatory variations on the basic principle of
reciprocation. For example, in laboratory tests with 500 subjects, Wilson discovered that pure
reciprocation (such as tit for tat) produced more cooperation than several conciliatory variations
that attempted to coax the other party out of a consistently competitive pattern. Wilson, supra note
55, at 182-84; see also Deutsch, Epstein, Canavan & Gumpert, Strategies of Inducing Cooperation:
An Experimental Study, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 345, 354-59 (1967) ("deterrent" strategy
more effective than "turn the other cheek" strategy); Komorita, Cooperative Choice in a Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, 2 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 741 (1965); McClintock, Gallo &
Harrison, Some Effects of Variations in Other Strategy Upon Game Behavior 1 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 319, 322-24 (1965); Scodel, Induced Collaboration in Some Non-Zero Sum
Games, 6 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 335, 338-39 (1962).
These investigators found that a tit for tat strategy, or a close variation, results in more mutual
cooperation than other contingent strategies, noncontingent strategies, or natural play. But see
Oskamp & Perlman, Factors Affecting Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 9 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 359, 365 (1965) (finding that a tit for tat strategy produced no more mutual
cooperation than an unconditionally cooperative strategy).
71. Predictability implies that a party will reciprocate either cooperation or competition
promptly and consistently. This does not mean that an impulsive retaliation is necessarily superior to
a measured response that reciprocates only after the other's defection is clear. But the principle of
reciprocation does require both predictability and contingency in order to successfully elicit a
cooperative pattern. See Wilson, supra note 55, at 186; see also Hoedemaker, Distrust and
Aggression: An Interpersonal-International Analogy, 12 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 69, 70-72 (1968);
Sawyer & Guetzkow, Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 466 (H. Kelman ed. 1965).
72. See R. AXELROD, supra note 8, at 36 (defining forgiveness as the propensity to cooperate in
the succeeding move after the other party has defected).
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as "martyrdom" or "stupidity. ' 73 But the precommitment model has an
ex ante focus. Thus, forgiveness reflects a belief in the power of teaching
by example. By the simple expedient of punishing evasion and rewarding
cooperative adjustment, a party assuming a leadership role can "bring
out the best" in the other and thereby reinforce the cooperative
equilibrium.
Parties to long-term contracts should be able to announce a precom-
mitment to conditional cooperation and thereby encourage a stable pat-
tern of cooperative adjustment. Nevertheless, contractual breakdowns
frequently occur. Determining whether a cooperative game model is a
useful framework for analyzing real-world contracting behavior thus
requires a more complex and textured analysis. My analysis to this point
has set aside important variables that frequently occur in actual contrac-
tual interactions. In Part II, therefore, I introduce more realistic
assumptions in order to isolate the conditions that can undermine pat-
terns of cooperation. I then evaluate the various legal and extralegal
mechanisms that contracting parties use to reinforce their cooperative
strategies.
II
THE DYNAMICS OF RISK ALLOCATION AND ADJUSTMENT
IN LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
The game theoretic model in Part I unrealistically assumed that the
parties' adjustment choices can be costlessly interpreted as either cooper-
ative or evasive, and that both cooperative and retaliatory reactions can
be costlessly enforced. In fact, acquiring information about the other
party's actions and implementing an appropriate response are both costly
and potentially fallible. Information problems are often exacerbated in
real-world contractual interactions by genuine uncertainties as to the
other party's actions during the previous adjustment crisis.
Furthermore, the various incentives to cooperate or evade do not
remain constant over a continuous (presumably infinite) series of interac-
tions. A more realistic analysis, then, must consider two additional vari-
ables: (1) each party's discount rate (that is, the rate at which the present
value of future payoffs decreases when projected into the future); and (2)
the exogenous probability that the interactions will terminate after a
finite time. These variables introduce additional instabilities that
threaten emerging patterns of cooperation.
The cooperative game model also was unduly restrictive in its
assumptions about how parties might respond to information and
enforcement deficits. It assumed that the parties could not rely on prior
73. See A. RAPOPORT AND A. CHAMMAH, supra note 54, at 72.
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reputation and interactions with others to predict the likely strategy of
prospective contractors. Moreover, it assumed that the parties did not
have any mechanisms, other than the "discipline of continuing dealings,"
for enforcing their initial commitment to cooperative adjustment.
In the following sections, I will relax each of these assumptions in
order to examine both the problems caused by information and enforce-
ment deficiencies and the range of mechanisms parties can use to over-
come them.
A. The Problem of Information Deficiencies
Selecting an appropriate strategy for adjusting contract risks
becomes more complicated when the contracting parties' behavior can-
not be readily understood. This problem is particularly acute in the con-
text of contractual evasion. Parties rarely evade by directly announcing
their unwillingness to cooperate. They typically affirm solidarity, protest
helplessness in the face of intractable problems, or act in subtle ways that
are difficult to evaluate. Similarly, cooperative actions can also be misun-
derstood, especially if the ideal cooperative response is not immediately
apparent to the other party. For instance, the cooperative response to
Seller's increased production costs may be for Buyer to shut down rather
than to follow Seller's request and temporarily relocate production into
other contracts. Indeed, a contracting party may not realize until much
later the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of its partner's
response.74
L Extralegal Responses to Information Deficits: Reputation and
Other Signaling Mechanisms
There are several ways to reduce the costs of acquiring information
concerning the actions of a contracting partner. For instance, an estab-
lished reputation raises the inference that observed behavior will be
repeated in future transactions.75 Prior knowledge about the strategy a
74. Background "noise" or systematic misperception of the other's actions might cause
information deficiencies. Misperception may stem from cognitive errors--e.g., relying on a small
sample size to characterize the other party's behavior. Cf. R. JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND
MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976) (discussing the effects of misperception in
international relations).
75. If the market for contracting partners is "thick," fear of the prisoner's dilemma diminishes
because each party has a strong desire to establish its credibility so that it can engage in future
contractual relationships. Thus, the key variable in the well-developed market is each party's ability
to choose its own partners. See Tullock, Adam Smith and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 100 Q.J. ECON.
1073, 1076 (1985). But see Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 618-25 (1981) (showing that even in a competitive market,
reputation, goodwill, and the benefits of repeat business do not completely deter the temptation to
evade).
In the specialized "thin" market of the long-term contract, where the choice among contracting
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party is likely to pursue reduces the relative importance of characterizing
each subsequent interaction accurately.
But a prior reputation can also be an impediment. By revealing
one's likely future actions, a reputation exposes a party to exploitation.
Fear of exploitation may, in turn, lead to costly defensive maneuvers that
reduce the value of the reputation. Contracting parties have an incen-
tive, therefore, to develop a reputation that both encourages mutually
beneficial cooperation and deters exploitation.76 Once again, a precom-
mitment to reciprocity resolves this dilemma. A reputation for adhering
to conditional cooperation offers the best chance of overcoming the
threat imposed by inadequate information. A strategy that promises
immediate retaliation cannot be readily exploited. Moreover, conditional
cooperation fosters interparty cooperation and (perhaps most impor-
tantly) sends an unambiguous signal to both existing and potential future
contracting partners.
Reputation itself is costly. To reduce the costs of acquiring a cooper-
ative reputation, contracting parties use various signaling mechanisms.
One such device is "labeling"; basing assumptions on fixed characteris-
tics of other parties that can be easily observed when the interaction
begins. Janet Landa has demonstrated the value of labeling for ethnically
homogeneous Chinese middlemen who pursue cooperative strategies
based on fixed and immutable characteristics such as familial identity
and dialect. 77 Since the familial relationship reflects a pre-established
and highly effective system for enforcing group norms, this status carries
a unique guarantee of mutual cooperation. Although few such unambig-
uous labels are likely to be available to most commercial contractors,
there are substitute methods of status identification. For instance, com-
mercial parties often form trade associations that promulgate ethical
partners is limited, reputational concerns are much less potent. Rights accrued under a long-term
contract with little likelihood of replication may be more valuable than a general reputation for
cooperation. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 1013.
76. Several studies establish the relevance of a prior reputation for being trustworthy. Merton
Deutsch first identified the significance of trust in influencing the outcome of prisoner's dilemma
games. See Deutsch, Trust and Suspicion, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 267 (1958). Absent trust,
one party can undermine an emerging pattern of cooperation by viewing the other's cooperative
behavior as a subtle trap or deception. Indeed, investigators have shown that credible promises
(those made by parties historically known to keep their word) induce more cooperation than
promises made by parties with no established reputation. See Gahagan & Tedeschi, Strategy and the
Credibility of Promises in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 12 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 224, 229-31
(1968); Horai & Tedeschi, Effects of Credibility and Magnitude of Punishment on Complibnce to
Threats, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 164, 168-69 (1969) (more credible threats also
effective in generating patterns of cooperation). On the general question of the importance of
making cooperation and punishment predictably contingent on the other party's response, see R.
AXELROD, supra note 8, at 118-23.
77. Landa, A Theory of the Ethically Homogeneous Middlemen Group: An Institutional
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 358-60 (1981).
[Vol. 75:20052032
LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
norms for contracting behavior. While members of trade organizations
are not as tightly bonded as Chinese middlemen, membership does offer
useful signals to other contractors. Similarly, while bonds of trust and
confidence generated by family status cannot be replicated in commercial
settings, parties can adopt territorial strategies using a pattern of trade
with "neighbors" as a substitute signaling technique.7"
Where Seller and Buyer cannot rely on prior reputation or labeling,
they can signal their future behavior by using individualized or transac-
tion-specific devices. One such device is offering to pledge assets as col-
lateral for the promise of subsequent cooperation.7 9 Alternatively, a
party can agree to pay a substantial penalty for a breach of its obligation
to adjust cooperatively. Both devices signal a party's resolve to adjust
according to the pre-committed pattern of conditional cooperation.8"
Even without a legally enforceable contract, self-enforcing systems (such
as third-party stakeholders) can reinforce such commitments.
The preceding discussion has focused on the value of a reputational
signal when the parties are engaged in continual interaction. Now con-
sider the case of a finite interaction between the parties. If the parties
know in advance the termination point of their relationship, they con-
front a well-known "end-game" problem that threatens cooperation in
the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Because cooperation will no longer be
beneficial at the last adjustment opportunity, a party will be motivated to
evade and capture its largest payoff. Anticipating that response, the
other party has a similar incentive to evade at the next to the last oppor-
tunity (its own last opportunity for choice). Anticipating this, the other
party evades at his previous opportunity and so on. Following this logic,
the cooperative solution to the entire sequence unravels.8t
Fortunately, parties cannot accurately predict the number of inter-
actions in most long-term contracts in advance, so the threat of a cooper-
ative pattern unraveling is implausible. However, some parties to a long-
term contract do approach a definite termination point (for example, the
end of a twenty-year term). In order for the sequence of cooperation to
remain stable, each party must be assured that the other's commitment
to cooperate will continue until the end of their relationship.
78. R. AXELROD, supra note 8, at 158-68.
79. See Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATIONS 5,
12-15 (1985).
80. See Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 928 (1986)
(discussing security interests as means of encouraging cooperation between certain debtors and
creditors).
81. See R. LucE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 37, at 98-101. The fact that the utility-maximizing
logic of the problem leads to "unreasonable" results (in which "stupid" players end up doing much
better than "smart" ones) is a criticism of the repeated prisoner's dilemma as a complete normative
theory. Indeed, the empirical results demonstrate that strong patterns of mutual cooperation emerge
even in the game with many trials. See A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, supra note 54, at 66.
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One method of signaling a resolve to cooperate is to develop a gen-
eral reputation for altruism. When a party is known to be cooperative
despite self-interest, the other will not fear evasion in the last stages of
the relationship and thus will not take defensive actions.82 Alternatively,
a self-interested commercial party can achieve the same outcome by
developing a reputation for conditional cooperation. For example, if
Seller has resolved always to follow a principle of reciprocation (cooper-
ating initially, but thereafter adjusting only for those who cooperate in
return), Seller will develop a reputation of never being the first to evade.
Seller can maintain this reputation only by refusing to evade even at the
last opportunity of a particular relationship. Such a reputation will
induce Buyer to maintain cooperative responses throughout the relation-
ship.83 A reputation for conditional cooperation is an effective antidote
to the end-game problem in contractual settings because contracting par-
ties can choose their own partners. Thus, reputation is valuable for
future as well as present relationships.
2. Reducing Adjustment Uncertainty: The Effects of Legal Signals
The preceding discussion suggests that the ability of contracting
parties to achieve a cooperative equilibrium depends significantly on the
clarity and predictability of the extralegal signals they use to convey their
intentions. In addition, legal rules ameliorate the problems of imperfect
information.
The relationship between legal and extralegal mechanisms can be
clarified by isolating the two crucial periods of information exchange in
the contracting process: initial risk allocation and adjustment. During
the adjustment period, reputation and other extralegal devices are the
principal means of reducing the effects of information deficits. At this
stage, legal regulation plays only a supplemental role in ensuring the gen-
eral quality of these signals.8 4 The law has a much more pervasive func-
tion, however, in reducing information deficiencies that impair the initial
82. Cf Becker, Altruism, Egoism and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology, 14 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 817, 822 (1976) (explaining interaction between altruists and egoists as leading egoists
to simulate altruists); Hirshleifer, Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The Importance of Having the
Last Word, 15 J. ECON. LITERATURE 500, 501 (1977)(noting some limitations of Becker's model).
83. Ronald Wintrobe argues that a strategy based on reciprocity is as effective as pure altruism
in solving end-game problems. He also argues that it is much less costly, since the altruist continues
to make donations to evaders while the party adopting conditional cooperation will retaliate-to
reduce his loss. Wintrobe, It Pays To Do Good, But Not To Do More Good Than It Pays, 2 J. EcON.
BEHAVIORAL ORGANIZATION 201, 211-12 (1981).
84. The law of fraud, prohibitions against false and deceptive advertising, and the protection of
trademarks all enhance the reliability of reputational signals. See generally E. KITCH & H.
PERLMAN, REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS: CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES 54-83,
253-76 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing legal regulation of information through laws governing false or
deceptive advertising and trademark protection).
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risk-allocation process. Contractual terms that distribute risks are sig-
nals designed to achieve various specific purposes. If these signals have
been inadequately designed or tested, they invite misunderstanding, disa-
greement, and, ultimately, mutual conflict.85
At the initial risk distribution stage, contract law offers two valuable
tools-the implied term and the express invocation-that, singly or in
combination, reduce errors and uncertainties in the initial agreement.
The implied term is the primary instrument for reducing errors in con-
tract formulation.86 By implying preformulated terms into the basic
agreement, the law supplies useful standardized risk assignments.87
Common law "rules" provide for many of the basic details of any con-
tractual relationship, including the timing, sequence, and standards of
performance. These rules consciously reflect dominant and evolving con-
ceptions of how similarly situated parties can be expected to assign risks
if required to bargain explicitly in advance.88
Judicially developed risk allocations have proved remarkably dura-
ble. The risk-control criterion, for example, was first announced in 1647
in Paradine v. Jane.89 Furthermore, judicially created implied terms
have been designed to accommodate diverse contractual environments.
For example, the two contrasting performance standards-perfect tender
and substantial performance-reflect a skillful accommodation of varia-
tions in the market for substitute performances.90
85. Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 261, 265-66 (1985).
86. Formulation errors are implementation mistakes-such as ambiguity, incompleteness,
inconsistency, and distortion-that result in contract terms that deviate from the subjectively desired
exchange. The costs of such errors include the failure to fully exploit contractual opportunities and
the unintended necessity of having the state interpret disputed contracts. Id. at 265-68.
87. Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 588 n.87.
88. "[Ihe common rules have been worked out by common sense, which has established what
the parties probably would have said if they had spoken about the matter." Globe Refining Co. v.
Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
89. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 27, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647) ("When the party by his
own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by
his contract.").
90. Sometimes sellers prefer a standard of substantial performance rather than strict
performance. A seller of construction services, for example, would dislike a strict standard because
requiring perfection could cause a substantial loss of the purchase price due to merely trivial defects.
Similarly, the builder could not feasibly "take his house back" if the owner decides to reject because
of a faulty latch. The parties to construction contracts, therefore, would presumably negotiate for a
rule of substantial performance in good faith, and this what the law requires. See Goetz & Scott,
supra note 24, at 1009-11.
Rejection imposes much lower costs on sellers in sales contexts than in construction contracts.
The perfect tender rule apparently reflects the result that parties to sales contracts would reach were
they to bargain over rejection. Buyers normally prefer to pay only for conforming goods. Rejection
leaves a seller with the goods, which can be repaired and resold at the market price or sold
immediately at a price that reflects their (slightly defective) condition. Id.
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But even the most skillful judicial craftsmen can construct implied
terms only through the slow, evolutionary process of common law adju-
dication. Accordingly, contract law has increasingly turned to the con-
tractual environment to supply implied terms. Custom, usage of trade,
and other experiences between similarly situated contracting parties offer
a rich source of common patterns for distributing and adjusting risks.91
A dominant trade usage within a particular industry will constitute an
implied term for all transactions within the relevant category. The con-
tractual environment thus supplies some mature, tested risk assignments
that the "individual parties could not replicate merely by the expenditure
of additional time and effort." 9
2
Implied terms provide contracting parties a foundation of reliable
signals for distributing risks. Particular circumstances, however, will
require expressly negotiated alternatives that supersede the implied
terms. The state may nonetheless play a role in the parties' choice of
individualized arrangements. Courts are more likely to misinterpret an
agreement that combines individually negotiated provisions with custom-
ary terms.
The uncertainty over judicial interpretation may actually exacerbate
imperfect signaling of the parties' risk distribution preferences in the ini-
tial agreement. For example, in one case contracting parties agreed to a
price term with an escalation clause that provided: "In no event.., shall
91. These customary terms include trade usages regarding the existence of warranties, see
U.C.C. § 2-314(3) comment 3 (1978); commonly accepted quality tolerances, see, e.g., Ambassador
Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 499, 190 N.W.2d 275, 278-79 (1971); and
circumstances under which apparently fixed price and quantity terms are in fact subject to some
variation, see, eg., Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 9-10 (4th Cir. 1971).
92. Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at 278 ("[The process of contractual formulation is subject
to inherent endogenous hazards that emerge and undergo correction only over time. Accumulated
experiences are thus very important in shaping customary contractual prototypes." Id.)
An instructive example of the evolution of implied terms is the "best efforts" standard that
regulates the quantity term in exclusive dealings contracts. Initially, common law courts, citing the
absence of a definite quantity term as evincing an illusory obligation, declined to enforce exclusive
dealings agreements. See, eg., Bay v. Bedwell, 21 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929); Barton v.
Spinning, 8 Wash. 458, 460, 36 P. 439, 440 (1894) (listing early cases). Thereafter, in Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, Judge Cardozo, finding such arrangements "instinct with an obligation" created
the "best efforts" implied term. 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917). In the following 70
years, courts have constructed an increasingly coherent best-efforts jurisprudence, relying on
evidence of customary contractual relationships and using the benchmark of the integrated firm to
define the performance obligation. See, eg., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 614 (2d
Cir. 1979) (enforcing best-efforts obligation against the licensee-distributor by awarding damages
projected from the behavior of "comparable" brands marketed by other distributors); Contemporary
Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1977) (music publishing); Perma
Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d Ill, 115 (2d Cir.) (patent licenses), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
987 (1976); Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34, 281
N.E.2d 142, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1972) (book publishing).
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the... increase in the contract price... exceed the price listed below.",93
The parties apparently believed that the limited escalator merely supple-
mented the standard implied term that performance would be excused
entirely if adversely affected by unforeseeable circumstances. The court
mistakenly interpreted this effort as an attempt to countermand the doc-
trine of excuse altogether. As a consequence, when the price adjustment
mechanism failed, the court assigned to the performing party both fore-
seeable and unforeseeable risks. In the resulting conflict, the relationship
disintegrated. 94
A second legal mechanism, the express invocation, can help to clar-
ify these uncertain signals. An express invocation is a term that carries a
legally unambiguous meaning that the courts will strongly, perhaps even
irrebuttably, presume.9" The legal recognition of certain talismanic
words and phrases greatly facilitates parties' attempts to integrate the
express and implied terms of their agreement. This benefit has motivated
parties to use a variety of internationally recognized force majeure and
commercial frustration clauses to govern certain types of long-term con-
tracts. 96 Ideally, contracting parties should be able to pick and choose
among a predetermined menu of such standardized express terms in
order to construct an unambiguous risk-allocation scheme.
97
Unfortunately, while standardization of terms reduces the uncer-
tainty associated with complex risk assignments, it also impedes experi-
mentation with innovative arrangements. Contracting parties are likely
to encounter substantial problems when they seek to develop innovative
agreements for distributing risk. In the first place, they may have diffi-
culty escaping the standardized arrangements since any interpretive dis-
agreements are likely to be resolved by judicial recourse to the very same
93. Publicker Indus. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 990 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
94. Id.; see also Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. Ct.
App.) (seller's claim of excuse denied because seller "agreed to the use of the Industrial Commodities
Index Factor"), cert denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
95. Although "[d]efinitional recognition does not change the optional character of these
express terms," it does serve to standardize the terms' meaning regardless of the context in which
they are employed. Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at 282.
96. See, eg., United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna 1980) art. 79, reprinted in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
307, 355 (D. Campbell & C. Rohwer eds. 1984); Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods (The Hague 1964) art. 74, reprinted in I SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
UNIFORM LAw 41, 55 (K. Zweigert & J. Kropheller eds. 1971); General Agreement on Foreign
Trade (GAFTA) model contract 100, clause 22:
Force majeure strikes, etc.-seller should not be responsible for delay in shipment of the
goods . . . occasioned by any Act of God, strike, lockout, riot or civil commotion,
combination of workmen, breakdown of machinery, fire or any cause comprehended in the
term force majeure....
97. "The state's recognition of the evolutionary trial and error process functions as a
regulatory scheme designed to promote these 'public goods.'" Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at 286.
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context that contractual innovators seek to escape.98 As a consequence,
the state's institutional support for implied terms results in a bias against
unconventional expressions.99
Furthermore, even assuming the parties to one contract can create
new contractual language that will escape the problems of conventional
implied terms, the parties may be unable to coordinate adoption of the
new arrangement by other contractors." The state's control of the
mechanism by which such contract terms are officially recognized makes
private efforts more risky than using the existing standardized terms and
serves, on balance, to retard the evolutionary process.101
In sum, a paradox underlies the parties' reliance on the law of con-
tract to signal their risk allocation objectives. The very rules that facili-
tate complex risk-distribution strategies serve a largely unrecognized
regulatory function as well. These customary allocations retard the par-
ties' ability to develop innovative risk-distribution schemes, despite new
or emerging business needs. Furthermore, the state's control over the
interpretation process restrains already weak market forces that might
encourage innovation. Thus, despite the use of legally standardized sig-
nals, the precise intentions of parties to long-term contracts may remain
98. A number of recent cases demonstrate the difficulty of using express terms to countermand
ill-fitting implied terms. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 782 &
n.14 (9th Cir. 1981) (merger clause, excluding evidence of prior dealings, does not bar introduction
of usage of trade to alter price term in the contract); Steuber Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 646 F.2d 1093,
1096-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (evidence of course of performance held to vary normal meaning of C.I.F.
term in written contract); Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355, 360 (4th Cir.
1980) (same, F.A.S. term); Legnos v. United States, 535 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir. 1976) (despite
express term "F.O.B. Vessel" in the contract, international context requires that "the intention of
the contracting [parties], rather than definitional niceties, must be given controlling weight"),
99. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at 290-91.
100. A transition to new contract terms incurs two distinct types of costs. First, the parties
must bear the costs of innovation, which include identification of terms that have potential
advantages over the status quo. The lack of copyright protection for such contract terms means that
the first set of costs will not reliably be recaptured by the innovator. See Goetz & Scott, supra note
85, at 292; cf Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (Ist Cir. 1967) (particular form
of contest rule is uncopyrightable if the idea is so straightforward or narrow that there are only a
limited number of ways to express it).
Second, when the advantages of the new terms depend on standardization, groups of
contracting parties must coordinate joint adoption of a standard formulation of the new
arrangement. No single contractor is likely to fully capture the benefits of coordination because these
benefits depend on "agglomeration economies"; that is, other parties must make the move in
sufficient numbers to yield advantages from standardization. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at
291-93.
101. Over time, the state-supplied [risk assignments] will themselves fail to evolve because
the flow of innovative formulations, express and implied, will dwindle. The raw material
from which preformulations emerge consists of the expressions and experiences of
individual bargainers confronting new and challenging contractual problems. If that trial-
and-error experience is diminished because parties turn to convenient standardized terms
offered by the state, the evolutionary process itself stagnates.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at 289. These barriers to innovative strategies for distributing risks are
a byproduct of the state's regulation of standard risk allocation arrangements.
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uncertain. Nevertheless, legal signals do promote a sense of predictabil-
ity, which is essential to any cooperative equilibrium.
B. The Enforcement Dilemma
Predicting the adjustment strategy of a contracting partner is ham-
pered further by efforts to discipline uncooperative behavior. Ideally, a
single retaliatory response of equal consequence can deter occasional
instances of noncooperation. Thus, where constant payoffs recur at regu-
lar intervals, the principle of reciprocation through continuous dealings
is entirely self-enforcing.
In the more realistic case, the intervals between adjustment choices
and the levels of reward and punishment vary. Under these conditions,
the parties must turn to supplemental enforcement systems in order to
maintain the relative advantages of long-term cooperation over short-
term evasion. Each party can threaten retaliation to insure that the other
will properly internalize the joint costs of mutual conflict. To be effec-
tive, however, the proposed threats must be both carefully calibrated and
credible. Credibility, in turn, requires both ex ante commitment and ex
post sanctions.
1. Extralegal Enforcement Mechanisms
a. Self-Enforcing Agreements
Many of the mechanisms that serve an ex ante signaling function
also serve an ex post enforcement purpose. For example, the threat of
forfeiting a bond or a pledge of security may induce a party to commit to
a strategy of conditional cooperation. While the coercive effect of secu-
rity interests or penalty bonds derives from legal recognition, once cre-
ated these devices are largely self-enforcing. Thereafter, the self-
enforcing security interest or penalty bond functions as a credible com-
mitment, binding the promisor to a predictable pattern of future
behavior.102
This use of contractual sanctions must, however, be carefully cali-
brated to ensure a stable cooperative equilibrium. Suppose, for instance,
that Seller offers Buyer assets as a "hostage" to insure Seller's compli-
ance with an agreement to adjust cooperatively. If the hostage assets
have a ready resale value, then Buyer will have a perverse incentive to
induce a breach, declare default, and sell the assets. Ideally, the hostage
102. See Scott, supra note 80, at 928 n.90; see also Grossman & Hart, Corporate Financial
Structure and Managerial Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY
107, 109-10 (J. McCall ed. 1982); Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 522-26 (1983) (developing a formal hostage model in the
context of private ordering in intermediate product markets).
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should deter Seller from evasion but not tempt Buyer to cheat. 0 3 This
result is ensured if the asset's value to Seller is idiosyncratic. On the
other hand, where the assets are readily marketable, both parties profit if
Buyer is restrained from foreclosing on the bond when the relationship is
threatened by adjustment crises. 1°4
Self-enforcing agreements are not costless mechanisms. They
require substantial monitoring and a punitive sanction for evasive tactics.
Even if the noncooperating party understands and "accepts the punish-
ment," retaliation imposes stress on the relationship that may threaten a
cooperative equilibrium. It is in the parties' mutual interests to ground
the relationship within an established network of social norms. This
makes enforcement, when necessary, easier to administer and accept.
b. Norms, Ethics, and Other Informal Mechanisms for Social Control
Scholars have long recognized that group generated norms, individ-
ual ethics, and other informal mechanisms play important roles in regu-
lating contractual relationships."0 5 While we are a long way from an
accepted theory of social control, few would quarrel with the assumption
that many informal norms and ethical systems serve a functional pur-
pose.10 6 For the purposes of this essay it is only important to see that a
number of social forces may contribute to control of long-term contrac-
tual relations.
The pervasive social norm of reciprocity' 017 is particularly relevant
103. See Williamson, supra note 102, at 526-27.
104. Scott, supra note 80, at 930.
105. See, e.g., I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50
U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1983); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963); Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw.
U.L. REv. 340 (1983).
106. The process by which norms develop and are passed on to subsequent generations is
unclear, but most social psychologists rely on utilitarian, functionalist premises. See Krebs & Miller,
Altruism and Aggression, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 18-19 (G. Lindzey & E.
Aronson 3d ed. 1985). One researcher has argued, for example, that the norm of reciprocity
functions as a stabilizing force, cementing social relationships and discouraging exploitation.
Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 161,
172-76 (1960); see also E. WALsrER, G.W. WALSTER & E. BERSCHERD, EQUITY: THEORY AND
RESEARCH 6-8, 15-16 (1978) (socially generated norms of equity serve to prevent individuals from
following their natural inclinations to maximize their own outcomes at others' expense).
Robert Ellickson has suggested that absent "social imperfections" (such as the lack of any
prospect of a future relationship), "the norms that govern relations among members of a group will
tend to maximize the aggregate wealth of group members." Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and
Sociological Theories of Social Control 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 98 (1986).
107. Gouldner suggests that there is a universal norm of reciprocity consisting of two
fundamental principles: "(1) People should help those who have helped them, and (2) People should
not injure those who have helped them." Gouldner, supra note 106, at 171. Substantial evidence
from social science research supports the claim that individuals from a variety of cultures behave in
accordance with this norm. See, eg., E. WALSTER, G.W. WALSTER & E. BERSCHERD, supra note
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to contractual interactions. The origins of the cultural disposition to
reciprocate remain unclear, but underlying most current theories is the
assumption that behaviors that work well in a particular social system
are selected, and those that do not are discarded.1"' The analysis in this
Article supports the theory that the norm of reciprocity encourages indi-
viduals to behave cooperatively long enough for them to discover its
long-run benefits, thus bridging the gap between short-term and long-
term payoffs.109
The social norm of reciprocity offers a peculiarly stable foundation
for a strategy of conditional cooperation. The strategy seems credible
because it relies upon behavioral responses that "go without saying." To
be sure, reciprocity standing alone cannot always create a cooperative
equilibrium. One need only recall the familiar vaudeville skit of mutual
slaps escalating into all out combat to realize that reciprocity can polar-
ize a relationship as well as nurture it."
Other social norms compensate for the dangers of "negative" reci-
procity. Thus, in many commercial environments, norms such as hon-
esty, promise keeping, trust, and solidarity are also prevalent."' For
example, Stewart Macaulay's study of contractual behavior among busi-
ness firms found that two norms were almost universally supported:
"One ought to produce a good product and stand behind it;" and "Com-
mitments are to be honored in almost all situations.""' 2 These norms
reinforce an initial predisposition to cooperate, which is then reinforced
by reciprocal interactions." 3
One explanation for the norms that emerge from business contexts is
their utility as supplemental methods of regulation.' ' Macaulay's study,
106, at 95-98; Gergen, Ellsworth, Maslach & Seipel, Obligation, Donor Resources, and Reaction to
Aid in Three Cultures, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 390 (1975); Staub & Sherk, Need
for Approval, Children's Sharing Behavior, and Reciprocity in Sharing, 41 CHILD DEv. 243 (1970).
108. The relationship between normative standards and normative behavior remains uncertain.
Generally, social psychologists assume that normative standards are triggered by paradigmatic
situations. Once "activated," these standards then mediate individual normative behavior. See
Berkowitz, Social Norms, Feelings and Other Factors Affecting Helping and Altruism, 6 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 63 (1972); Lerner, The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to Its
Origins and Forms, 45 J. PERSONALITY 1 (1977); Leventhal, The Distribution of Rewards and
Resources in Groups and Organizations, 9 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 91 (1976).
109. Krebs & Miller, supra note 106, at 28.
110. While it seems intuitively plausible that the norm of reciprocity is retaliatory when one
individual is harmed by another, there is some evidence that it serves a more limited and "benign"
function. Under this conception, the "eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth" formulation in the
Hammurabi Code was intended to restrict revenge by requiring a measured, proportional response.
See id. at 25-26.
111. See Ellickson, supra note 106, at 92-93.
112. Macaulay, supra note 5, at 63.
113. Ellickson, supra note 106, at 92.
114. See generally Alexander, Evolution and Culture, in Evolutionary Biological and Human
Social Behavior, supra, at 59, 68-69 (because culture represents the cumulative maximization of the
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for example, suggests that the ordinary expectation that a seller stands
behind a product provides the initial impetus for a precommitment to
conditional cooperation." 5 Thereafter, the obligation to honor commit-
ments deters evasion in instances where the payoffs from short-term
exploitation might seem greater than the present discounted value of
future interactions. In short, trust, solidarity, and mutual respect may
help to solidify the relationship and permit it to survive the myopia of
individual decisionmakers.1 16
In addition to group norms, individualized controls on behavior-
systems of personal ethics-are also important regulators. 1 7 Durable
and frequent interactions among specific individuals can promote cooper-
ation between two firms. While it is unlikely that firms themselves can
develop a true interdependence, managers who deal with each other over
repeated interactions are a powerful substitute.
2. Legal Enforcement as a Facilitator of Cooperative Adjustment
a. The Benefits of Legal Enforcement
Because extralegal enforcement mechanisms may not be sufficient to
achieve a cooperative equilibrium, it is important to consider the benefits
parties may derive from appealing to the state's coercive power to
enforce agreements. To understand better the ex ante effects of legal
enforcement, assume that all legally binding agreements can be costlessly
and perfectly enforced. Under these ideal circumstances, the question is,
when, if ever, parties will seek external enforcement of their agreements.
A legal dispute resolution system has significant advantages over
extralegal mechanisms in ameliorating the problems that cause
interparty deadlock. These advantages are evident when the parties have
a genuine disagreement over the meaning of key terms in the agreement.
As previously discussed, to design a complex strategy for distributing
risks, parties must combine individualized express terms with preformu-
interests of "all humans who have lived," it is difficult for particular individuals or groups to "alter it
so greatly or rapidly"); Durham, Toward a Coevolutionary Theory of Human Biology and Culture, in
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
39, 52 (N.A. Chagon & W. Irons eds. 1979) (because the well-being of individuals depends on the
success of their groups, it is in most individuals' best interest to accept these "norms, rules and
cultural controls on selfish individual behaviors").
115. See Macaulay, supra note 5, at 63.
116. See Scott, supra note 10, at 346-47 (arguing that self-generated rules and norms that parties
use to manage their choices have a powerful feedback on the process of making judgments).
117. See J.L. MACKIE, INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 115-20 (1977). The prisoner's
dilemma illustrates the
practical value of the notion of obligation, of an invisible and indeed fictitious tie or bond,
whether this takes the form of a general requirement to keep whatever agreements one
makes or of various specific duties like those of military honour or of loyalty to comrades
or to an organization.
Id at 119.
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lated implied terms. Since the combination of express and implied terms
often will be unique, these disputes frequently cannot be resolved by
resorting to the parties' collective experience. The state, however, as the
developer of implied terms, enjoys a significant advantage in interpreting
the agreement. This advantage is enhanced by judicial knowledge of the
accumulated experience of other, similarly situated contracting parties
who have grappled with analogous contingencies. 18
Furthermore, even if the state had no interpretive advantage, its
ability to authoritatively resolve disputes would be a key factor in devel-
oping a cooperative equilibrium. One of the effects of the parties' inade-
quate information is that spiteful interactions may result when one party
mischaracterizes the other's response to an adjustment choice. Assume,
for instance, that one party declines to adjust when asked, and instead
disputes the meaning of the agreement. The appropriate response for the
party requesting adjustment depends on whether the dispute is a genuine
difference of opinion that is consistent with the cooperative pattern, or is
an attempt to evade an assigned risk. Spiteful responses to these uncer-
tainties can quickly generate an "echo" effect of mutual recrimination
and retaliation that will threaten the relationship. 1 9
Spiteful interactions are at least partially controlled by a legal sys-
tem that is both authoritative and formally neutral. The state derives
authority from its power to coerce compliance with its judgments, and
achieves formal neutrality through its reliance on a set of preexisting
rules of adjudication. From the perspective of encouraging a cooperative
equilibrium, it is quite irrelevant that the law may achieve neutrality
through a legal process that masks underlying social and economic
inequalities.
To be sure, the parties need not rely on judicial resolution of dis-
putes. Frequently they will prefer third-party arbitration to judicial dis-
pute resolution because arbitration often reduces the direct or
administrative costs of enforcement. In order to reduce total enforce-
ment costs, however, the reduction in administrative costs must be
greater than any increase in indirect costs such as the costs of increased
error, bias, or nonenforceability. 2 ° Arbitration works best, therefore, in
118. To be sure, the state's interpretive advantage is only comparative. The state creates an
irreducible risk of "interpretation error" in situations where parties have combined express and
implied terms in their agreement. Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at 272.
119. A spiteful action is any retaliation generated by a unverifiable belief that the other is taking
advantage of contractual uncertainties. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 18-19 (1970) (exploring the inefficiency of coercive collection
mechanisms as a means of dealing with failures of reciprocity).
120. One of the social costs of arbitration is the lack of published opinions. Dispute resolution
is a key method for testing contract terms. Surviving terms are reliable. If those terms that have
survived are not generally communicated to the industry, a valuable source of reliable experience is
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specialized environments such as labor law, where the arbitrators
develop an acknowledged expertise, operate frequently enough to correct
for bias, and issue judgments enforceable by the state.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, access to legal enforcement
provides a credible threat of severe retaliation should one party deviate
significantly from the cooperative pattern. Without such a "large strike"
capability, each contracting party would be subject to the other's defec-
tion whenever the shadow of the future proved insufficient to prevent
evasive behavior. This occurs when the short-term gains from defection
exceed the present discounted value of future cooperation. Social norms
and self-enforcement are unsatisfactory safeguards in this situation. If
the parties must stockpile an arsenal of self-enforcing deterrents (such as
hostages) to guard against substantial defections, they will incur uncom-
pensated costs. Thus, the demand for a mechanism to maintain the fun-
damental structure of the relationship represents a classic public goods
problem. No single set of contractors can hope to capture sufficient ben-
efits from such an investment to offset the costs of a retaliatory arsenal.
As a consequence, there would be no deterrent to large scale defections if
the parties were limited to self-enforcing mechanisms.
b. The Limits of Legal Enforcement
I have suggested that legal rules can reduce the tensions inherent in
the adjustment process that threaten the cooperative equilibrium. Unfor-
tunately, problems arise in the attempt to ensure cooperative adjustment
within the constraints of a legally enforceable obligation. These
problems are the product of an apparent paradox: Legal enforcement is
both a threat and a temptation. Any enforcement standard that suffi-
ciently deters evasion by one party will inevitably invite evasion by the
other.
If both parties would benefit by pursuing separate paths, they can
mutually agree to terminate their relationship. Problems develop, how-
ever, when one party's self-interest suggests a noncooperative response
despite the fact that the parties' joint interest would be better served by
maintaining the relationship. 2 ' Defection from the cooperative norm
lost. For a discussion of some of the other limitations of conventional arbitration, see infra text
accompanying notes 133-36.
121. Given plausible assumptions about how future preferences are discounted, individuals
whose preference-ordering is constant may nonetheless make inconsistent choices over time. Strotz,
Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REv. ECON. STUD. 165, 165 (1956);
see also Hammond, Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice, 43 REv. EcoN. STUD. 159
(1976). Contra Pollak, Consistent Planning, 35 Rv. EON. STUD. 201, 202 (1968) (concluding that
although Strotz's argument for a "strategy of consistent planning" is sound, his calculation of a
corresponding consumption plan formula is incorrect). Thus, despite social and legal controls, a
contracting party may choose the smaller, more immediate reward from evasion, despite a long term
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may occur in several contexts. Often, a risk will materialize that threat-
ens the adversely affected party with substantial losses. This may lead the
risk bearer to evade its assigned responsibility. For example, sharp and
unanticipated price increases in the grain and commodities markets in
the mid-1970's tempted many farmers to evade their responsibility for
delivering crops at the contract price. They subsequently attempted to
escape liability by relying on the statute of frauds as a bar to the enforce-
ability of their oral contracts. 122  Such behavior is a rational response
only when the gains from selling the crop on the open market at current
prices exceed the value of a continuing relationship with a wholesaler. 123
Defection may also occur when a party attempts to extract a pre-
mium in return for its cooperation in reducing the other's losses. For
example, assume that an unanticipated event such as a labor strike
increases the costs of the goods Seller is bound to deliver under the con-
tract. A legally binding contractual obligation deters evasion by requir-
ing Seller to bear the cost of the price increase. But what if Buyer can
adjust its delivery schedule and substantially reduce Seller's loss? Ironi-
cally, the very potential of enforcement simultaneously tempts Buyer to
withhold the adjustments that might minimize Seller's loss. Despite
extralegal factors, which encourage cooperation, Buyer may engage in
foot dragging, inflating estimates of adjustment costs, or demanding a
payoff to cooperate.1 24 This form of "extortion" may threaten a relation-
ship just as severely as Seller's attempt to evade the assigned risk.
In sum, when an adjustment opportunity arises, the prospect of legal
enforcement provides each party with a reciprocal set of options.125 As
obligors, they can choose to comply voluntarily with their assigned
responsibilities or evade them. Conversely, as obligees, each party may
select an enforcement strategy that is either flexible or severe. If an obli-
preference for the larger, but deferred benefits of cooperation. Cf Strotz, supra, at 173-75
(discussing similar individual decisions in daily life).
122. See, eg., Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975); Decatur Coop.
Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976); Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977). See generally A. SCHWARTZ & R. Scorr, supra note 1, at 40-42 (analyzing
the problem of characterizing farmers as merchants under U.C.C. § 2-202(2)).
123. The cotton farmer problem is more complex than this example suggests. The farmers can
evade once and then explicitly agree not to repeat this behavior. Similarly, a manufacturer can make
defective products and thereafter offer elaborate warranties to offset the fallout from the first episode.
This analysis merely suggests, however, that reputational restraints are insufficient, standing alone,
to generate a cooperative equilibrium. See Klein & Leffler, supra note 75, at 623.
124. See, eg., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); Lingenfelder v.
Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d
124, 272 N.E.2d 533 (1971). See generally Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts,
65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981).
125. The following discussion of the dilemma of devising optimal enforcement systems draws on
Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAw & Soc'y REv.
179 (1984). A similar model had occurred to me independently and is sketched out in Goetz &
Scott, supra note 24, at 983-84.
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gee adopts a flexible strategy-such as permitting deviations wiihin an
acceptable range and voluntarily undertaking any appropriate adjust-
ments-and the obligor complies fully with its responsibilities, then both
parties benefit from mutual cooperation. Both sides thus avoid expensive
enforcement costs.
On the other hand, if the obligor evades responsibility and the obli-
gee resorts to coercive legal enforcement, both incur substantial costs in
the resulting litigation. Moreover, each obligor is tempted to evade its
responsibilities if the obligee announces a flexible enforcement policy that
makes legal sanctions improbable. Conversely, an obligee is tempted to
use the threat of tough legal sanctions to extract a premium for
cooperation.
The severity of the enforcement standard contributes a new dimen-
sion to the parties' decisionmaking. 126 A flexible performance standard,
such as the doctrine of substantial performance which governs construc-
tion contracts, reduces both the clarity of the standard and the severity of
legal enforcement, thereby increasing evasion by obligors.127 The desire
to restrain evasion may instead motivate the parties to adopt clear but
tough standards, such as the perfect tender rule. Although these bright-
line rules do deter the obligor from evasion, they also tempt the obligee
to defect by demanding a premium in exchange for relaxing the tough
enforcement rule. In short, tough enforcement standards are potentially
incompatible with the desire for flexible and adaptive adjustments.
The tension between the tough standards needed for effective
enforcement of the initial distribution of risks and the flexible enforce-
ment necessary to encourage cooperative adjustment is inherent in the
legal regulation of long-term contracts. Thus, while legal enforcement
can be beneficial in encouraging cooperative adjustment, it is not a pan-
acea. Admitting and understanding the limits of legal enforcement in
realistic contractual relations reveals the myopia of contemporary legal
discourse. We must examine contractual relationships within a broader
matrix of social control that encompasses both legal and extralegal
forces.
C. Patterned Cooperation in a Bargaining Regime
Legal and extralegal regulatory systems reduce, but do not elimi-
nate, the problems caused by imperfect information and enforcement. In
order to analyze the effects of these chronic deficits, I now relax my ear-
lier assumption that the parties are unable to bargain about adjustment
126. See Scholz, supra note 125, at 182.
127. The flexibility of the substantial performance standard removes opportunities to exploit
inadvertent breaches. Such a rule is sensible in construction contracts, where renegotiation costs
otherwise would be substantial. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 1010 & n.l 16.
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opportunities. Assume, to the contrary, that parties to long-term con-
tracts may formally renegotiate contracts at positive but not prohibitive
costs. In this more realistic contractual setting, patterns of cooperation
are still valuable. Patterned behavior now becomes a powerful econo-
mizer, reducing the costs of conflicts that otherwise impair the
relationship.
L The Economizing Function of Cooperation
The capacity of contracting parties to bargain about adjustments
does not mean that renegotiation will be a common response to an
adjustment problem. Whether parties resolve an adjustment crisis by
formal renegotiation or cooperative adjustment depends on the relative
costs and benefits of each alternative. Because patterned cooperation is
reflexive and habitual, it is less costly than a renegotiated adjustment.' 28
Whenever adjustment problems are bargained, a party with specialized
skills becomes more vulnerable to strategic responses from the other.
The threat of excessive renegotiation costs therefore induces each party
to invest in alternative arrangements as precautions against a bargaining
impasse.
Cooperative adjustment remains a powerful regulator of long-term
contractual relationships despite the fact that major adjustment crises
may require individualized responses.12 9 The higher stakes in these cases
will justify the additional costs of renegotiation. Recognizing that con-
tracting parties must accommodate the risks of both large-scale and con-
ventional defections illuminates how nonlegal factors that reinforce
patterned behavior relate to legal enforcement.
Stewart Macaulay has established that the recurring, conventional
problems of maintaining cooperative relationships in a business setting
are chiefly enforced through nonlegal mechanisms. 130 The common
business attitude is reflected in one subject who reports: "[I]f something
128. The advantages of cooperative adjustment include savings in insurance costs, negotiating
time, and lawyers' fees. A precommitment to conditional cooperation also eliminates the costly
strategic behavior that attends renegotiation.
129. Adhering to a preestablished rule of behavior for managing these complex choices removes
the responsibility for the particular choice from the decisionmaker and thereby reduces regret and
decisionmaking costs. The phenomenon of "regret aversion" assumes that the status quo is the
reference point individuals use to evaluate future choices in terms of relative gains and losses.
Making choices carries a decisionmaking cost, because taking responsibility has secondary
consequences. Individuals feel regret if a loss occurs as a result of their decision and pride if their
choice results in gain. But individuals weight the anticipated cost of regret more heavily than the
corresponding benefit of pride. All other things being equal, individuals are thus reluctant to make
choices where they feel responsible for the outcomes. See Scott, supra note 10, at 337-42; Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39, 52-54
(1980).
130. Macaulay, supra note 105, at 61.
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comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with the
problem. You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you
ever want to do business again." 13' As an example of how well estab-
lished this attitude is, Macaulay tells of the large manufacturer of pack-
aging materials who inspected its records and found that it had failed to
create legally binding contracts in two-thirds of the orders randomly
selected for review.'32 The mere anticipation of mutually rewarding
future transactions maintains the cooperative equilibrium in such cases.
Macaulay concludes that commercial relationships are largely gov-
erned by "social" as distinct from "legal" norms. But this conclusion is
incomplete. It is precisely when this anticipation of future interactions
breaks down (in cases where the short-term payoffs from defection are
substantial) that parties are likely to request renegotiation and raise its
attendant threat of legal enforcement. Thus, individualized and pat-
terned responses regulate different aspects of the contractual relationship
in much the same way as conventional and nuclear weapons deter against
different acts of aggression and noncooperation by the superpowers.
2. Reducing the Adjustment Variance by Contract
Tradeoffs between cooperative adjustment and renegotiation also
affect the ex ante bargaining process. The major threat to a cooperative
equilibrium is the variance in the magnitude of adjustment crises. The
degree of adjustment required in any circumstance correlates to each
party's temptation to evade its contractual responsibility. Social norms
and self-enforcing agreements help to regularize this variance by reduc-
ing the divergence between short-term exploitation and long-term
cooperation.
Contracting parties may also modify the initial risk distribution
scheme because they anticipate a large-scale adjustment crisis and its
attendant costs in terms of renegotiation or breakdown. One possibility
is to craft the initial risk assignment so as to reduce the expected variance
of any future adjustment. For example, Victor Goldberg argues that a
complex price adjustment mechanism, such as the one developed in
Alcoa, 3 3 functions principally to reduce the bargaining range for future
renegotiation rather than to allocate risks efficiently.' 34 By adopting a
risk-sharing strategy at the outset, parties can reduce the stress on subse-
quently developed patterns of cooperation. Unfortunately, this risk-shar-
ing strategy may also sacrifice some of the potential for risk reduction
131. Id.
132. Id. at 60.
133. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980); see supra
text accompanying notes 13-14.
134. Goldberg, supra note 16, at 531-33.
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that a binary allocation would provide. The parties may therefore toler-
ate a short-term failure to assign risks ideally in order to preserve their
long-term objectives.
Contracting for dispute resolution mechanisms other than media-
tion, arbitration, or litigation may provide an additional means of reduc-
ing the risk of high variance adjustment. While mediation and
arbitration may be less costly than traditional litigation, such conven-
tional techniques are not likely to effectively enforce cooperation in many
long-term contracts. Mediation is essentially an extended settlement
negotiation where parties exchange confidential information to neutralize
the risk of mischaracterization of the other's actions. Arbitration is a
similarly attenuated adversarial process for authoritatively resolving dis-
putes. Conventional dispute resolution methods thus encourage the par-
ties to tolerate disputes during the performance of the contract, and to
seek resolution only after the relationship has terminated.135 In contrast,
the cooperative model argues for immediate and authoritative resolution
of disputes while the tempering influence of the continuing relationship
can be used to discipline evasion.
A more sensible means of exploiting the considerable power of the
long-term relationship may be appointment of a permanent contract ref-
eree.1 36 The referee is essentially a single arbiter who can minimize both
information and enforcement problems on an ongoing basis. Indeed, a
skillful referee can serve both conventional arbitration and mediation
goals. Ideally, the contract referee would be authorized to investigate,
inspect or discover facts; to require the parties to adjust cooperatively;
and to issue a final and binding judgment where the disagreement cannot
be resolved. Such a mechanism has the distinct advantage of comple-
menting rather than undermining the social controls that promote pat-
terns of conditional cooperation.
To recapitulate: Contracting parties use a mix of legal and extrale-
gal mechanisms, as well as patterned and individualized responses, to
ameliorate the information and enforcement deficits that threaten emer-
gent patterns of cooperation. Nevertheless, contractual breakdowns are
inevitable. Patterns of cooperation in contractual relationships are inher-
ently unstable, especially where one party is threatened with substantial
losses (or tempted by substantial gains). Where the necessary adjust-
ments are of lesser magnitude, however, social norms aimed at inducing
long-term cooperation will often prompt adjustment, and legal rules pro-
vide appropriately remote, but harsh, deterrents and incentives.
135. J. Myers, Why Conventional Arbitration is Not Effective in Complex Long-Term
Contracts 12-15 (paper presented at International Symposium on The Complex Long-Term
Contract, Heidelberg, Germany, Oct. 2-3, 1986).
136. Id. at 22-25.
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D. Normative Implications
L The Role of Binary Legal Standards in a Regime of Flexible
Enforcement
The symbiotic relationship between legal rules and social control
mechanisms may explain why contract law frames its customary risk
assignments in terms of categorical, binary rules, such as the doctrines of
perfect tender, mistake, excuse due to supervening cause, and breach of
contract.1 37 These rules assign risks on an all-or-nothing basis, thereby
deterring evasion better than multifactored formulations, but tempting
obligees to extort a premium in exchange for their agreement to enforce
the rules flexibly. 138 Indeed, this tension best explains the anomaly of
well-developed legal doctrines of commercial impracticability and frus-
tration and the courts' simultaneous reluctance to excuse nonperform-
ance in particular cases. 139  Legal rules facilitating a cooperative
equilibrium must strike a balance between tough and flexible enforce-
ment of contractual obligations. Where the legal doctrines are formu-
lated in binary terms-perform in full or excuse entirely-this balance
may require combining a flexible general rule with a tough enforcement
policy for particular cases."
The cooperative model resolves the apparent paradox of legal
enforcement. Under this conception, the many binary contract rules
serve as effective complements to the more flexible extralegal mecha-
nisms that regulate adjustment. More complex, multifactored rules may
thus be undesirable to most contracting parties because they sacrifice
clarity in return for only marginally reinforcing existing patterns of
cooperation.
In cases such as Alcoa or Westinghouse,14 1 however, where one
137. Breach of contract has a binary character which I have described elsewhere as the
"breacher-status" problem. There is only one breacher, and he frequently loses the entire benefit of
his bargain. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 983-84.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
139. See supra note 1.
140. The incongruity between the existence of legal doctrines authorizing excuse and the
reluctance of courts to find the conditions for excusing performance satisfied is a function of the
complexity of sorting out the parties' ex ante risk assignments. A court must approach excuse cases
with either a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of the contract or a willingness to
adjudicate the issues on a case-by-case basis. Under these circumstances, the enforcement
presumption generates stronger incentives for the parties to create force majeure and other
exculpatory clauses tailored to their own needs.
141. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981);
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts, 436 F. Supp. 990 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977)
(transferring all related actions to the federal district court for consolidated pretrial proceedings).
The Westinghouse Corporation had made long-term contracts to supply large amounts of uranium
at fixed prices to power companies that used nuclear reactors. A price rise in uranium concentrate
would have subjected Westinghouse to a loss of approximately two billion dollars if all its contracts
were enforced. Westinghouse refused to perform and subsequently negotiated settlements with some
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party's gross misfortune is matched by the other's huge windfall, the
long-run benefits of cooperation pale against the enormous short-term
gains from evasion. The relevant contract rules do not prevent break-
downs in such "high variance" cases because their all-or-nothing charac-
ter is much more of a disadvantage when so much more is at stake. Even
so, unpredictability as to the interplay between legal and extralegal meth-
ods of maintaining a cooperative equilibrium argues for restraint in judi-
cially imposing adjustments. Given the highly interactive nature of the
parties' responses, it is difficult to know whether one party's refusal to
adjust cooperatively in a particular case represents exploitative behavior
or a measured, retaliatory response to an earlier noncooperative action
by the other. Because of this uncertainty, any legally-imposed adjust-
ment may create perverse incentives that undermine the stability of the
cooperative equilibrium of contracting parties.
Specialized contractual relationships may require more varied and
complex mechanisms than the current set of legal rules provide if con-
tracting parties are to achieve an optimal resolution of their conflicting
goals. The cooperative model developed in this Article, however, sug-
gests that contracting parties may nonetheless prefer the categorical,
binary rules of contract law when the social norms break down. This
analysis at least partially explains the puzzling divergence between the
frequently observed patterns of cooperative adjustment and many of the
inflexible rules of contractual obligation. Visualizing legal rules as part
of an interrelated system of contractual cooperation reconciles some of
these apparent paradoxes.
2. Improvements in Legal Signaling and Enforcement
The preceding argument does not imply that efforts to create more
innovative legal mechanisms are either futile or counterproductive. As
explained earlier, a systematic bias underlies the process that generates
legally standardized signals for the various risk-bearing strategies parties
use. 142 Many of the information problems discussed result from the mis-
interpretation of signals. These interpretation errors stem from the
power of customary implied terms to dominate efforts to create a unique
alternative.143 This, in turn, suggests that the number and variety of
express invocations is inadequate. The problems arising under the stan-
of its major suppliers. Others brought suit for breach of contract. For a discussion of the factual
and legal background, see Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977). For a similar case involving Atlas Corporation's
uranium contracts, see Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
142. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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dard force majeure and gross inequities (or good faith adjustment)
clauses vividly demonstrate this inadequacy.
In the case of force majeure provisions, for example, the standard
clause deals adequately with the routine situations such as a short strike,
or Acts of God such as fire or flood.'" However, many adjustment con-
tingencies involve "economic" force majeure, such as an oil embargo, the
enactment of new government regulations, or an unstable labor force.
These events generate risk-bearing uncertainties that the standard formu-
lations cannot resolve. For instance, when does a supplier become aware
of the occurrence of these economic contingencies? Is excessive absentee-
ism the type of labor problem that is embraced in the words "industrial
disturbances"? Do the words "and any other case, whether of the kind
enumerated or otherwise"' 45 apply only to "unforeseen" events? After
all, it is entirely "foreseeable" that these kinds of events will occur, ren-
dering performance impracticable. Indeed, that is the very reason for
including a force majeure clause in a contract. Yet absent a legally rec-
ognized invocation that expressly trumps the foreseeability notion, the
parties must either enumerate each contingency in detail or face the
uncertainty that a court will interpret the general language in a force
majeure clause as excusing only unforeseeable contingencies.' 46
Similar problems plague the application of adjustment provisions
such as the typical gross inequities clause.147 What constitutes a gross
inequity or "an unusual economic condition"? What is meant by adjust-
ment through mutual consent? Suppose one party refuses to cooperate?
It remains entirely unclear whether, and to what extent, a standard gross
inequities claim is legally enforceable.' 4 1
In sum, the current process of judicial interpretation and occasional
legislative codification has produced insufficient conventions for formu-
144. See supra note 34.
145. Young, supra note 34, at 156-57.
146. See, eg., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 989-92 (5th
Cir. 1976) (General language in force majeure clause excuses only unforeseen events that prevent
performance.). This unforeseeability requirement was criticized in Opera Co. v. Wolf Trap Found.,
817 F.2d 1094, 1102 n.14 (4th Cir. 1987).
147. The following is a typical gross inequities clause found in a long-term coal supply
agreement:
Any gross inequity that may result in unusual economic conditions not contemplated by
the parties at the time of the execution of this agreement may be corrected by mutual
consent. Each party shall in the case of a claim of gross inequity furnish the other with
whatever documentary evidence may be necessary to assist in effecting a settlement.
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving either the purchaser or
seller from any of its respective obligations hereunder solely because of the existence of a
claim of inequity or the failure of the parties to reach an agreement with respect thereto.
Young, supra note 34, at 143.
148. Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 425
U.S. 952 (1976) is a rare reported case considering the enforceability of a gross inequities claim. The
court merely held that the claim was arbitrable.
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lating individualized risk-bearing arrangements. Contracting parties
often must resort to uncertain signals. For parties to long-term con-
tracts, therefore, interpretive disputes-with their attendant stress on the
cooperative norm-are inevitable until the state provides the requisite
instruments for more accurate signaling.
CONCLUSION
The bargain theory of contract has dominated legal scholarship for
well over one hundred years. In its most recent manifestation-the
hypothetical bargain heuristic-the theory continues to enrich our
understanding of the source and function of many legal rules. Over the
past decade, however, scholars from diverse academic traditions have
begun to focus attention on relational contexts in which some of the
assumptions of bargain theory may no longer hold. Despite the advances
in relational theory,14 9 a subtle and lingering effect of the preoccupation
with the bargain paradigm has been an implicit assumption that ex ante
and ex post bargains are the only mechanisms by which contracting par-
ties achieve their objectives. Modem decision analysis and game theory
offer an alternative heuristic, one that illuminates the regulatory power of
nonbargained patterns of reciprocal cooperation.
By imagining contracting parties as unable to bargain over adjust-
ment, we can analyze their relationship in terms of a strategic interaction
game, such as a prisoner's dilemma. This exercise reveals the power of
patterns of behavior based upon a principle of reciprocation. Although
parties to long-term contracts are removed from the discipline of a com-
petitive market, patterned adjustments that are both predictable and con-
tingent will tend to develop and stabilize the relationship. In real-world
interactions where parties can bargain over adjustments, these patterns
continue to function as powerful economizers by reducing the costs of
bargaining.
The failure of bargain theory to explain contractual behavior com-
pletely does not justify the contrary inference that bargaining is an insig-
nificant force in long-term contracting. Rather, the relational context is a
complex environment of many regulatory systems, including individual-
ized and patterned responses, legal and social norms, and ex ante and ex
post bargains. The challenge for contract law is to construct a legal
apparatus that complements these forces. As a first step, we must aban-
don the assumption of legal centrism and acknowledge our incomplete
understanding of contractual relationships and of the linkages between
149. The tentative state of the scholarly project is exemplified by the different labels given to
analyses of conflicts of interest. Thus, what I describe as relational theory travels as well under the
name "agency theory" or "transactions costs theory." No wonder we have a hard time penetrating
traditional analyses.
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legal rules and social norms. Although a game theoretic framework does
not offer specific prescriptive guidance, it does offer a cautionary perspec-
tive for those who advocate judicially imposed adjustment of long-term
relationships.
To be sure, reciprocal cooperation does not ensure equilibrium in
long-term contractual relationships. Inescapable information and
enforcement deficits will frequently threaten to generate a counterpattern
of mutual conflict. Understandably, manifestations of conflict, such as
those in Alcoa, invite more elaborate regulation of these relationships.
However, legal intervention to forestall noncooperation may have offset-
ting effects on the social norms within which the relationship has
evolved. I conclude, therefore, that the law's traditional deference to
party autonomy may well reflect the most sensible accommodation of the
conflicting goals of long-term contractual relationships.
